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ABSTRACT 
Contracts are fundamental for today’s networked business practices. Various 
professionals plan, design, and implement contracts, yet many of them find contracts 
difficult or even impossible to understand. Furthermore, contracts are mostly 
designed to safeguard parties’ rights––not to support collaboration. 
In this dissertation, I argue that many counterproductive contracting practices 
stem from traditional economic and legal theories. Drawing on alternative 
approaches to contracting, such as transaction cost economics, the relational view, 
functional contracting, the relational contract theory, and proactive contracting, I 
explore how organizations use contracts in their interorganizational exchange 
relations and how these different uses affect relational governance, for example, trust 
and social norms, and relationship performance. The methodological standpoint of 
the dissertation is American New Legal Realism (ANLR). 
The dissertation consists of a summary and four Publications. The first and 
second Publication rely on an action research case study and explore how the 
functional contracting approach could facilitate a business model transition which is 
often plagued by a number of barriers. The third Publication draws on an expert 
interview study of 24 contracting professionals. It examines how companies use 
contracts and how these uses affect relational governance and exchange 
performance. Finally, the fourth Publication examines how companies utilize the 
various functions of contracts and frame their purchase contract documents. 
Overall, this study found that in addition to the three established functions––
safeguarding, adaptation and coordination––contracts are used to serve at least four 
additional functions: codification, internal management, collaboration, and policy. 
Even though organizations use all these functions, safeguarding seems to be the most 
common. Overemphasis of the safeguarding function has negative impacts on both 
theory development and contracting practice. Thus, I urge both academics and 
practitioners to adopt the functional contracting approach to design contracts that 
comprehensively meet the specifics of the exchange and enhance business success. 
KEYWORDS: functional contracting, relational governance, relational contract 
theory, proactive contracting, contract design, contract framing, American New 






ANNA HURMERINTA-HAANPÄÄ: Sopimusten monet funktiot: Miten 
yritykset käyttävät sopimuksia liikesuhteissaan 




Sopimukset ovat välttämättömyys nykypäivän verkostoituneessa liike-elämässä. 
Niitä suunnittelevat ja käyttävät eri alojen ammattilaiset. Silti monilla on vaikeuksia 
ymmärtää vaikeaselkoista sopimuskieltä. Lisäksi sopimukset laaditaan usein 
turvaamistarkoituksessa eikä tukemaan osapuolten välistä yhteistyötä. 
Esitän väitöskirjassani, että useat haitalliset sopimuskäytännöt juontavat 
juurensa perinteisistä taloustieteellisistä ja oikeustieteellisistä teorioista. Tukeudun 
tutkimuksessani näille vaihtoehtoisiin teorioihin, kuten transaktiokustannusteoriaan, 
relationaaliseen sopimusteoriaan, proaktiiviseen sopimiseen sekä funktionaaliseen 
sopimiseen, ja tutkin, miten yritykset käyttävät sopimuksia liikesuhteissaan. Selvitän 
myös, millaisia vaikutuksia niillä on liikesuhteen muille hallinnan muodoille, kuten 
luottamukselle, sekä liikesuhteen toiminnalle. Tutkimuksen metodologisena viite-
kehyksenä toimii amerikkalainen uusi oikeusrealismi. 
Väitöskirja koostuu yhteenvedosta ja neljästä osajulkaisusta. Toiminta-
tutkimukseen perustuvissa ensimmäisessä ja toisessa julkaisussa tutkitaan, miten 
funktionaalinen sopimisprosessi voi tukea liiketoimintamallin muutosta, johon 
liittyy usein monia haasteita. Kolmas julkaisu perustuu 24 sopimusasiantuntijan 
haastattelututkimukseen. Siinä selvitetään, miten haastateltavien edustamat yritykset 
käyttävät sopimuksia liikesuhteissaan ja millaisia vaikutuksia niillä on suhteen 
muille hallinnan muodoille ja toiminnalle. Neljännessä julkaisussa analysoin 
yritysten ostosopimusasiakirjoja selvittääkseni, mitä funktioita niissä hyödynnetään 
ja miten ne on kehystetty. 
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että jo tunnistettujen funktioiden eli 
turvaamisen, mukauttamisen ja koordinoinnin lisäksi sopimuksia voidaan käyttää 
ainakin kodifiointiin, sisäiseen johtamiseen, yhteistyön johtamiseen sekä menettely-
tapojen ohjaamiseen. Vaikuttaa kuitenkin siltä, että sopimuksia käytetään yhä eniten 
turvaamistarkoituksessa. Turvaamisfunktion ylikorostamisella voi olla negatiivisia 
vaikutuksia sekä sopimusteorioiden kehittämisen että käytännön sopimustoiminnan 
näkökulmasta. Kannustankin tutkijoita ja käytännön toimijoita omaksumaan 
funktionaalisen sopimuskäsityksen ja muotoilemaan sopimuksia, jotka vastaavat 
parhaiten kunkin liikesuhteen erityispiirteitä ja tukevat niissä onnistumista. 
ASIASANAT: funktionaalinen sopiminen, relationaalinen hallinta, relationaalinen 
sopimusteoria, proaktiivinen sopiminen, sopimusmuotoilu, sopimusten kehystä-
minen, amerikkalainen uusi oikeusrealismi, empiirinen sopimustutkimus  
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1.1 The need to change the traditional view of 
contracts 
 “Contracts are often completely useless in practice, and very often 
unreasonable. I feel like I’m wasting my time with contracts”. 
“Sometimes when I’m finalizing the contract with the buyer, neither of us exactly 
understands what we are agreeing to in the document. It might be a great paper when 
a dispute arises, but perhaps we should also understand what we are signing”. 
These comments were made by a CEO during an interview that I conducted as part 
of this research project. He is not alone in his views. The quotes illustrate two current 
problems related to contracts and contracting.  
First, contracts are often drafted by lawyers for lawyers (Berger-Walliser et al. 
2011: 56). This is still the case even though research shows that nearly 80% of the 
content of a contract is about business and financial terms and not about legal terms 
such as liabilities, indemnities and intellectual property (Cummins 2003: 4). In 
practice, professionals from various fields, such as engineering, procurement, finance, 
and law, use business-to-business (B2B) contracts in their everyday work. Yet lawyers 
are often in charge of contract drafting, which makes contracts difficult or impossible 
to understand for 88% of business users (WorldCC 2016; Vitasek 2017). 
Second, the focus of contract negotiations, as well as of the contract document 
itself, is very often on safeguarding the interest of the party that has the most 
bargaining power. The result is that contracts create and support arms’-length1 or 
adversarial relationships, which are known to create a spiral of opportunism and 
underperformance (e.g. Ghoshal & Moran 1996; Moeller et al. 2006; Frydlinger et al. 
2016; Schilke & Lumineau 2018).  Oftentimes these counterproductive practices are 
justified by referring to the rules of the game: Everyone must understand that “It’s not 
 
 
1  Arm’s-length relationships are based on the idea that contracting parties are adversaries 
and compete with each other (Moeller et al. 2006: 70). 
Anna Hurmerinta-Haanpää 
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personal, it’s just business” (Weber & Mayer 2011: 61; Frydlinger et al. 2016: 13). 
However, in today’s fragmented and decentralized economy, organizations are 
dependent on their global network of suppliers and business partners, and value is 
created through collaboration with network members (WTO 2019).2 Thus, instead of 
creating and supporting adversarial relationships, contracts should take into account 
the relationship-specific aspects of exchanges, promote the creation of trust, and 
encourage communication and collaboration (Frydlinger et al. 2016; Passera 2017). 
Where do these counterproductive customs stem from? Along with many other 
researchers, I believe that the conceptualization of contracts by traditional economic 
and legal theories still influence contracting practices (e.g. Nystén-Haarala 1998; 
Haapio 2013; Passera 2017). Specifically, the classical contract law system that 
prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the US reflected the 
neoclassical economic model’s ideas of spot market contracts and rational decision-
makers (Gordon 1985; Smith & King 2009).3 Thus, the system was formalistic, 
favored specific planning, ignored the relationship-specific aspects of contracts and 
opposed contractual flexibility (Macneil 1978). It is a long time ago since the 
neoclassical economic model and the system of classical contract law were 
complemented by legal and economic theories––such as the relational contract 
theory and transaction cost economics (TCE)––that took into account the 
relationship-specific aspects of exchanges, but these traditional models still affect 
the ways in which we understand contracts, their purposes, and their uses.  
Indeed, in the legal field, the so called relationalists, Stewart Macaulay and Ian 
R. Macneil, followed the traditions of legal realists and called for a contract law 
system that would take into account the relational aspects of exchanges (e.g. Gordon 
1985; Feinman 2000). In the field of economics, Oliver E. Williamson, who believed 
that humans are only boundedly rational and inherently opportunistic, presented 
similar ideas. Williamson claimed that because of the inherent opportunism of 
humans, transactions that differ in their attributes4 need to be governed by various 
governance structures5, which in turn are supported by the classical, neoclassical or 
relational contract law system (Williamson 1979, 1985, 1991, 2014). 
 
 
2  Indeed, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), two-thirds of world trade 
occurs through value chains and networks. See WTO 2019: 1. 
3  For more about neoclassical economics and classical contract law, see Sub-chapter 2.1. 
4  According to TCE, the variety of transactions is mainly explained by different 
transactional attributes. Williamson claims that the main transactional attributes are 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. For more about transactional attributes, see 
Sub-chapter 2.2. 
5  A governance structure refers to “the institutional framework within which the integrity 
of a transaction is decided” (Williamson 1979: 235). For more about the governance 
structures under study by TCE, see Sub-chapter 2.2. 
Introduction 
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A number of researchers have since elevated the ideas of the relationalists and 
transaction cost economists. Specifically in the field of organizational and 
management studies, research has shifted toward a broader view of contracts by 
focusing on their various functions and their interplay with relational governance. 
Relational governance refers to informal governance mechanisms, such as trust, 
flexibility and solidarity, which arise from the values and agreed-upon processes 
within a relationship and rely on self-enforcement by the contracting parties (e.g. 
Poppo & Zenger 2002: 709–710). This research criticizes TCE’s excessively narrow 
focus on opportunism and safeguarding, and highlights that in addition to 
safeguarding, contracts can, for example, coordinate and adapt the exchange 
relationship. Moreover, it argues that while formal governance (i.e. contracts) and 
relational governance complement each other, the different functions of contracts 
have distinct effects on relational governance. Finally, the two governance 
mechanisms have mutual effects on exchange relationships (Schepker et al. 2014).6  
The work of the relationalists and the transaction cost economists has also influenced 
the work of many legal scholars. Macaulay’s work in particular has inspired many law 
and economics scholars (sometimes referred to as economic relationalists7), who, like 
researchers of organizational and management studies, have found that at least in the 
context of innovations, the relationship between contracts and relational governance is 
more complicated than formerly believed. Scholars have suggested that contracts braid 
formal and informal enforcement mechanisms8, thereby facilitating transparency in 
information exchange, helping to screen for opportunistic counterparties and increasing 
switching costs––costs related to switching contracting partners (Gilson et al. 2009, 
2010, 2013, 2014). Similarly, Hadfield & Bozovic (2016) suggest that contracts function 
as scaffolding, helping organizations first determine whether the behaviors of the parties 
comply with the contract, and second guide the decision of whether to use informal 
enforcement, such as early termination, in cases of a contract breach.  
Another school of thought informed by the relationalists is the proactive 
contracting approach, which was founded in the Nordic countries in the late 1990s 
 
 
6  For more about the functional approach to contracting, see Sub-chapter 2.5. 
7  Legal research following the traditions of Macaulay and Macneil has split into two 
schools, which are often called “economic relationalism” and “socio-relationalism”. 
Although I myself relate more to the socio-relationalist school, I will limit further 
comparison between these schools because of the constraints related to the focus of this 
study. For more about the differences between the two schools, see Scott 2013. See also 
Tan 2019: 100–103. 
8  Formal enforcement refers to enforcement by third parties such as courts. Informal 
enforcement, in turn, refers to the means that the parties themselves can use to safeguard 
performance in cases of a contract breach. Examples of informal enforcement 
mechanisms are early termination of the relationship and reputational sanctions. See 
e.g. Gilson et al. 2010: 1379. 
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and early 2000s (e.g. Pohjonen 2002; Siedel & Haapio 2010; Berger-Walliser 2012). 
Unlike law and economics scholarship, the proactive contracting approach 
underlines the promotive, ex ante use of contracts and the legal and managerial 
functions of contracts (e.g. Nystén-Haarala 1998; Pohjonen 2002; Berger-Walliser 
2012; Haapio 2013). Gradually, the proactive contracting approach has grown into a 
multidisciplinary research stream that uses versatile methods to study contracts and 
contracting (Nystén-Haarala 2017). More recently, advocates of the approach have 
applied design-based methods such as experimenting, prototyping and user-testing 
to explore, for example, how to design contracts that can be used for organizations’ 
competitive advantage and how choices relating to contract design affect parties’ 
attitudes, behavior and the exchange relationship (e.g. Haapio & Hagan 2016; 
Passera 2017; Passera et al. forthcoming).  
Indeed, some of the studies of the proactive contracting approach proponents 
also form part of the emerging discussions on the social and psycho-cognitive effects 
of contract framing. Framing refers to heuristics that guide decision-making by 
drawing the reader’s attention to particular messages or events and by dismissing 
other elements (Tversky & Kahneman 1981: 453; Bertrandias et al. 2010: 2; Weber 
2017: 747). In the context of contracts, researchers have been interested in the 
connections between contract framing and regulatory focus, which refers to the 
different strategic means that people and organizations use to obtain desirable 
outcomes and avoid negative outcomes. According to the regulatory focus theory 
(RFT) introduced by professor of psychology and business Tory Higgins, two 
regulatory focuses affect people’s emotions and thus drive behavior: preventive and 
promotive. Preventively focused people see goals as minimal targets that must be 
met. Consequently, if the goal is not met, a person with preventive regulatory focus 
experiences high-intensity negative emotions. Conversely, if the person attains the 
goal, they experience low-intensity positive emotions. Promotive regulatory focus, 
in turn, leads to the interpretation of a goal as maximal. Thus, people with promotive 
regulatory focus experience low-intensity negative emotions if the goal is not met 
and high-intensity positive emotions if it is (e.g. Higgins 1997; Higgins et al. 1997).9 
Research on contract framing suggests that framing influences the creation and 
development of interorganizational trust (Mayer & Weber 2009; Bertrandias et al. 
2010; Weber & Mayer 2011; Weber & Bauman 2019), and that a contractual frame 
must be selected on the basis of transaction attributes, task characteristics and the 
type of relationship desired (Weber & Mayer 2011). 
Despite these advances in research, the traditional view of contracts endorsed by 
the neoclassical economic model and the classical contract law system seems to 
 
 
9  For more about RFT in the context of contract framing research, see Sub-chapter 2.8.  
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dominate the mainstream studies of contracts and contracting practice. One reason 
for this might be that while acknowledging the relational aspects of exchanges, many 
current approaches to contracts, such as TCE and economic relationalism, highlight 
the safeguarding and legal enforcement roles of contracts and understate contracts’ 
abilities to create, sustain and develop collaboration. Moreover, research that 
underlines the business potential of contracts, the various functions of contracts, and 
the relationship between contracts and relational norms, has developed under distinct 
research streams that barely recognize each other. Hence, there is clearly a need to 
combine the insights of these different theories to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the various uses of contracts. 
1.2 Objectives, research questions and data 
The aim of this dissertation is, by drawing on the above-mentioned theories, to 
examine the various uses of contracts in B2B exchange relations. Thus, the main 
research question of this dissertation asks: 
What are the functions by which companies use contracts in their 
interorganizational exchange relations, and what is the relationship between 
contract functions and relational governance in these relations? 
By interorganizational exchange relations, I refer to transactions that are conducted 
between two (or more) companies and the relationship that envelopes these 
transactions.10 Thus, the words exchange and transaction are used as synonyms in 
this dissertation. The research was limited to B2B exchanges for two reasons. First, 
the empirical data used in this dissertation were collected in liaison with the 
DIMECC REBUS research program, which focused on B2B relationships.11 Second, 
both business-to-consumer (B2C) exchanges as well as business-to-government 
(B2G) exchanges are highly regulated and thus, the freedom of contract in these 
 
 
10  The definition of exchange relation is borrowed from Macneil. He defines a contract as 
“relations among people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be 
exchanging in the future – in other words, exchange relations” (Macneil 2000: 878).  
11  The DIMECC REBUS research program aimed to develop new relational business 
practices for network governance. Altogether 22 companies and seven research 
institutions participated in the research program, which ran from 2014 to 2017. The 
program was managed by DIMECC (a strategic center for research in the Finnish 
digital, internet, materials & engineering industries) and funded by private companies, 
public research institutions, and Tekes (The Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation). 
For more about the research program, see DIMECC 2016. 
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fields is limited. However, the results may also be at least partly applicable to these 
types of exchanges.  
The main research question is addressed throughout this summary and in the four 
Publications. In addition, each of the Publications have specific contexts and objectives 
and operationalize the main research question in slightly different ways. Table 1 
summarizes the Publications’ research questions, data and method of analysis. 
Table 1. Research questions, data and method of analysis used in Publications. 








How can an industrial 
solution seller 
commercialize its solution 
with value-based selling 
techniques when using a 
highly advanced 
performance-based 
contract as the pricing 
device? 
Data from explorative and 
collaborative action 
research12: Material from 14 
monthly review meetings, 
50 solution productization 
meetings, 47 sales process 
development meetings, 4 
solution sales training 
workshops, 16 sales 
progress follow-up 
meetings, 6 MoU13 
development meetings, 7 
external stakeholder 
workshops, 8 financing 
model meetings, and 





following the two 












How can the functional 
contracting approach be 
utilized in the creation 
and governance of a 
business network? 
Same as in Publication I. Same as in 
Publication I. 






What are the functions by 
which companies use 
contracts to govern 
interorganizational 
relationships? How does a 
contract and its different 
functions affect relational 
governance (or vice versa) 
and interorganizational 
relationship performance? 




& Clarke 2006). 








How can the functional 
contracting approach be 
used as a contract design 
framework? 
Ten purchase contract 
documents of companies 
that participated in a 
survey and interview study 
conducted as part of the 









12  For more about explorative and collaborative action research, see Sub-chapter 3.2.1. 
13  MoU refers to a Memorandum of Understanding. See also Sub-chapter 3.2.1. 
14  See also Note 11. 
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The first and second Publications explore how the functional contracting approach 
could facilitate business network creation and governance in the context of business 
model transformation. The Publications draw on an action research case study in 
which the case company wanted to develop a new business model using value-based 
selling15 techniques and performance-based contracts16 but faced serious challenges 
when trying to implement the model. Our task was to identify the challenges and 
their root causes and to explore solutions to them.  
The third Publication discusses the functions by which companies use contracts 
to govern their interorganizational exchange relations. It also focuses on the 
relationships among relational governance, contracts and interorganizational 
relationship performance. The empirical data of the study consisted of 23 interviews 
of 24 contract experts.  
Finally, the fourth Publication explores how companies utilize the various 
functions of contracts and frame their purchase contract documents. It analyzes ten 
purchase contract documents and illustrates how the different functions of contracts 
appear in contracting practice and how the distribution among the functions and the 
framing, and the possible mismatches between the different functions, or between 
the functions and the framing, influence the buyer-supplier relationship that is 
created through the contract. 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation consists of this summary and four Publications, which have been 
published (or have been accepted for publication) in peer-reviewed journals or in 
edited books. The Publications are presented in full at the end of this summary. The 
summary broadens the theoretical background of the research project and re-
examines the results of the Publications in relation to the main research question. It 
is structured as follows.  
In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical bases of the research. First, I describe the 
neoclassical economic model and the systems of classical and neoclassical contract 
law that TCE and the relationalists critiqued. Second, I familiarize the reader with 
TCE, a neoinstitutional economic theory that studies different forms of governance 
comparatively. After this, I introduce some of the basic ideas of the relational 
 
 
15  “In value-based selling, sellers seek to understand and influence their customers' desire 
for value, quantify and communicate the value of their offerings to the customer, and 
devise a value-based pricing method to capture some of the value offered to the 
customer” (Publication I: 37). 
16  A performance-based contract refers to a contract in which “at least a portion of a 
contractor's compensation is tied to the achievement of specific and measurable 
performance standards and requirements” (Publication I: 37). 
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contract theory, review the literature of the two fathers of the approach, and discuss 
the impact of relationalism on subsequent research. Then I present more recent 
research streams which, although based on TCE, criticize its excessively narrow 
focus on formal safeguards and opportunism, and underline the interlinkages 
between formal and relational governance: the relational view and the functional 
approach to contracting. Thereafter, I introduce the proactive contracting approach, 
which shares similar ideas with relational contract theory, the functional contracting 
approach and the relational view. Finally, I review the literature on contract design 
and contract framing. Chapter 2 concludes by summarizing the theoretical 
approaches, by combining the common denominators of the theories, and by stating 
the entry point of my research. In Chapter 3, I first introduce my methodological 
standpoint, American New Legal Realism (ANLR), and then describe the research 
designs of the Publications along with their methods, data and analysis processes. 
Finally, I present some ethical reflections on my research. Chapter 4 summarizes the 
findings of the Publications and Chapter 5 re-examines these findings in light of the 
main research question. Chapter 5 also summarizes the implications of the research 
for contract theory, research, teaching, and managerial practice; considers its 
limitations; and provides directions for future research. Finally, Chapter 6 
summarizes the objectives and contributions of this work. 
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2 From neoclassical economics and 
classical contract law to the 
functional use of contracts 
2.1 The neoclassical economic model and the 
systems of classical and neoclassical contract 
law 
In the US, the laissez faire era was dominated by the neoclassical economic model17 
which adhered to Hobbesian individualism, according to which all humans are self-
interested utility-maximizers and thus, law was needed to coerce them to honor 
obligations toward others (Macneil 1978: 862–865; Macaulay 1985: 466–471; 
Gordon 1985: 568–569). The model also disregarded what Arrow (1969) called the 
“costs of running the economic system” (Arrow 1969: 48). Likewise, the system of 
classical contract law embraced the neoclassical economic model by resting on a set 
of general principles, such as the freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda, from 
which the rules governing specific cases could be derived. In essence, the system of 
classical contract law was based on the idea of two opposing contracting parties that 
acted out of self-interest but committed to a one-off market exchange by expressing 
their consent and free will in a contract. Thus, the system enhanced discreteness and 
presentiation18, favored specific planning, ignored the social or relational dimensions 
of the exchange, and opposed contractual flexibility (Macneil 1978: 863–864; Smith 
& King 2009: 5). 
The system of classical contract law was criticized mainly by American legal 
realists such as Arthur Corbin and Karl Llewellyn, who demanded that contract law 
 
 
17  For more about neoclassical economics, see Macneil 1981. The main point of the article 
is that both the neoclassical economic theory and TCE fail to accurately describe real-
world contracting. Macneil concludes that current economic theories are insufficient 
for useful economic analyses of all contractual relations. For more about TCE, see Sub-
chapter 2.2. 
18  Presentiation refers to bringing the effects of the future into present. In discrete, one-
off market transactions, the future is brought into the present by restricting the expected 
future effects of the transactions to those defined in the present. See Macneil 1978: 863. 
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should also consider social values.19 As a result, these values were written into the 
American contract law doctrine by the publications of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC)20 in the early 1950s and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in the 
late 1970s (Macneil 1981: 1050, Note 81; Feinman 2000: 738; Macaulay 2003: 48; 
Smith & King 2009: 6–7). Even though this new contract law system, conceptualized 
as the neoclassical contract law system, introduced many adjustments to the classical 
contract law, it was still based on the assumptions that parties acted out of self-
interest and only wanted to commit to one-off, discrete transactions. Thus, while the 
neoclassical contract law system enabled contractual flexibility through doctrines of, 
for example, unconscionability, the duty of good faith, and the inclusion of trade 
usage; and by techniques such as standards, third-party determination of 
performance, one-party control of terms, and agreements to agree, it still enhanced 
discreteness and presentiation (Macneil 1978: 865–886; Smith & King 2009: 6–7).21 
The neoclassical economic model, together with the systems of classical and 
neoclassical contract law, was gradually challenged by TCE in the field of economics 
and by the relational contract theory in the field of law. Next, I discuss these theories 
in greater detail, starting with TCE. 
2.2 Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics was developed as a counterweight to the neoclassical 
economic models of markets and the firm. Ronald H. Coase was the first scholar to 
challenge the prevailing view but only after two decades did the transaction costs 
gain attention in mainstream economics (Williamson 2014: 7).22 
 
 
19  This study embraces American New Legal Realism (ANLR), which developed from 
the American Legal Realist (ALR) movement. For more about ALR and ANLR, see 
Sub-chapter 3.1. 
20  The UCC is an American model code for commercial transactions created and revised 
by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). In order to have a force of law, the UCC must be 
adopted by an individual state. By now, all US states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted at least part of the UCC. For more about the UCC, see Georgetown University 
Law Library 2020. 
21  For the history of the American systems of classical contract law and neoclassical 
contract law, see Macneil 1978, 1981; Gordon 1985; Macaulay 1985, 2003. The 
American system of classical contract law is similar to what Finnish scholars usually 
call liberalist contract law. The neoclassical contract law system, in turn, can be 
compared to the Finnish discussion on the law of the welfare state. The Finnish and US 
contexts are, however, quite different. See Nystén-Haarala 1998: 5, Note 7, with 
references. 
22  Indeed, Coase discussed transaction costs already in his 1937 article. See Coase 1937. 
See also Coase 1960. 
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The most famous theorist associated with TCE is Oliver E. Williamson, who 
described the firm and contract as governance structures to be examined 
comparatively. Essentially, Williamson argues that governance structures, such as 
markets, hybrids and hierarchies, differ in their coordination, adaptation and 
safeguarding abilities23, and are supported and defined by a distinctive type of 
contract law system, based on Macneil’s classification of classical, neoclassical and 
relational contract law (Williamson 1979; 247–253; Williamson 1991: 271–276). 
Moreover, Williamson includes behavioral aspects, namely opportunism24 and 
bounded rationality25 in the theory and argues that the threat of opportunism always 
exists in business, and should be managed by binding the cooperating parties 
together. The objectives of the different governance mechanisms are thus, first, to 
safeguard the interest of the transaction parties because of the inherent opportunism 
of humans, and second, to adapt the relationship to changing circumstances 
(Williamson 1979: 258). 
TCE hypothesizes that because the main issue to be solved by an organization is 
that of adaption and because the main purpose of an organization is economizing26, 
organizations must align transactions, which differ in their attributes with 
governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a 
discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way (Williamson 1979: 234; 
Williamson 1991: 277; Williamson 2014: 8). The main transactional attributes that 
influence the choice of a most suitable governance structure are: 
- Asset specificity: the degree to which an asset can be redeployed for 
alternative uses by alternative users without sacrificing productive value. 
Asset specificity is further divided into six classes (1) site specificity, (2) 
physical asset specificity, (3) human asset specificity, (4) brand name 
 
 
23  Even though TCE acknowledges the adaptation and the coordination functions of 
different governance mechanisms, these only “matter to the extent they affect the 
comparative governance choice” (Schepker et al. 2014: 205). For more about the 
critique of TCE, see Sub-chapters 2.4 and 2.5. 
24  Opportunism extends simple self-interest seeking (adopted by neoclassical economics) 
to include self-interest seeking with guile, i.e. cheating, lying, deceit, and giving 
distorted information. Williamson’s central argument is that while most people keep 
their promises, some outliers will always act opportunistically, and that because these 
outliers cannot be ascertained ex ante, safeguards are needed to mitigate opportunism 
(Williamson 1979: 234, Note 3; Williamson 1985: 64; Williamson 2014: 8). 
25  The concept of bounded rationality is adopted from Herbert A. Simon and refers to 
humans’ limited ability to behave rationally as opposed to the intention of behaving 
rationally. See e.g. Simon 1947; Nystén-Haarala 1998: 222–223; Williamson 2014: 8. 
26  According to Williamson, economizing has two parts: economizing on production 
expense and economizing on transaction costs. The objective is to economize on the 
sum of production and transaction costs. See Williamson 1979: 245. 
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capital, (5) dedicated assets, and (6) temporal specificity (Williamson 
1991: 281); 
- Uncertainty: the lack of information regarding changes in circumstances. 
Uncertainty can be further divided into primary uncertainty, which is state 
contingent; secondary uncertainty, which arises from a lack of 
communication; and tertiary, behavioral uncertainty, which refers to 
strategic nondisclosure, disguise or distortion of information (Williamson 
1996: 60) 
- Frequency: the frequency by which transactions occur: one-time, 
occasionally, or recurrently (Williamson 1979: 246). 27 
The central thesis of TCE is that when transactions become uncertain and involve 
high asset specificity, they create exchange hazards28, thereby increasing the risk of 
opportunism. In these situations, markets give way to hybrids or hierarchies, because 
they provide more effective safeguards to deter opportunistic behavior (Williamson 
1979; Williamson 1991; Williamson 2014). In other words, TCE aims to recognize 
potential exchange hazards in advance and to invent governance structures to prevent 
or vitiate them (Nystén-Haarala 1998: 208). 
In summary, TCE combines insights from microeconomics, organization theory 
and contract law theory by identifying the critical dimensions of the transactions that 
determine the most effective governance structure with its underlying contract law 
system (Williamson 1979: 239, 261). Compared to neoclassical economics, TCE 
adopts a more microanalytical view, as it focuses in detail on transactional attributes 
on the one hand and on the governance modes and their specific features on the other 
(Williamson 2014: 8). 
Even though TCE departs from the neoclassical economic model, it has been 
criticized for its focus on opportunism and the safeguarding function of a contract 
(Ghosal & Moran 1996; Smith & King 2009). Even Macneil has criticized the theory 
 
 
27  Schepker et al. (2014: 195–197) identify two more transactional attributes from the 
TCE-related literature: complexity and bilateral interdependence. 
28  Examples of exchange hazards include: 1) Adverse selection, referring to the selection 
of an inappropriate contracting partner due to the organization’s difficulty in assessing 
the contract partner’s capability and intentions (e.g. Smith & King 2009: 14; Schepker 
et al. 2014: 196); 2) Moral hazards, such as shirking and cheating, which result from 
imperfect monitoring and/or enforcement in contracting (e.g. Smith & King 2009; 13–
14; Schepker et al. 2014: 196); and 3) The hold-up problem, in which a party abuses its 
power to extract benefits at the expense of the other. Anticipation of the hold-up 
problem is said to motivate the structure of contractual relationships (e.g. Smith & King 
2009: 17–18; Schepker et al. 2014: 196)). The term hold-up is sometimes used as a 
synonym to opportunism (e.g. Smith & King 2009: 18, Note 100). In my opinion, the 
hold-up problem is one manifestation of opportunistic behavior. 
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for its failure to accurately describe most contractual relations despite its other merits 
(Macneil 1981). Next, I discuss Macneil’s relational contract theory and the 
“relational school” in greater detail. 
2.3 Relational contract theory 
The two founders of the relationalist approach, Stewart Macaulay and Ian R. 
Macneil, continued the work of the legal realists by arguing that the systems of 
classical and neoclassical contract law covered only a fraction of real-world 
exchanges. They claimed that both economics and law should take into account the 
social context of exchanges (e.g. Macneil 1978, 1983, 1985; Macaulay 1985; Gordon 
1985; Feinman 2000; Smith & King 2009). Both understood law in broad terms: 
Macneil in Fullerian terms, as “the purposive enterprise of subjecting men to the 
guidance of rules” (Macneil 1983: 368, Note 73), and Macaulay as the living law 
according to Eugen Ehrlich (Macaulay 2005; Macaulay 2006).29 
As to the relevance of formal contract law, Macaulay and Macneil argued that 
most exchange relations are governed by norms deriving from social structures that 
are often not affected by official contract law at all (e.g. Gordon 1985; Macaulay 
1985). Thus, they emphasized the discontinuity and marginality of official contract 
law in the governance of contractual relations and argued for a system of relational 
contract law that would emphasize cooperation, trust, mutual responsibility and 
connection in exchange relationships (e.g. Gordon 1985; Feinman 2000). 
Consequently, according to Macaulay and Macneil, a system of relational contract 
law that would rest on standards rather than rules would better reflect the contracting 
reality and be justifiable for all exchange relations. 
Apart from these similarities, however, Macaulay and Macneil have followed 
different research paths: Macaulay has focused on studying the empirical reality of 
contracts, and Macneil has focused on conceptualizing and theorizing the relational 
view (Gordon 1985; Braucher & Whitford 2013).30 Next I discuss these two distinct 
but interrelated viewpoints.  
 
 
29  For more about the living law in the context of ANLR, see Sub-chapter 3.1. 
30  While Macaulay embraces sociolegal studies and ANLR (for more on ANLR see Sub-
chapter 3.1), Macneil is more of a conceptual theorist and denies belonging to either 
the “sociological” or the “critical” school (Macneil 1983: 384, Note 132). 
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2.3.1 Macaulay and the empirical study of relational 
contracting 
Stewart Macaulay’s most famous study is that reported in his 1963 article dealing 
with the use and non-use of contracts in business (Macaulay 1963).31 More 
specifically, he studied the use of contracts for creating a business relationship, 
adjusting the relationship and sanctioning default, by interviewing 68 sales 
managers, purchase managers and lawyers from 43 manufacturing companies and 
six law firms. He also studied the reasons behind the use and non-use of contracts.  
Macaulay found that, first, commercial experts in particular, such as procurement 
managers and sales managers, avoided the use of contracts and relied instead on 
relational governance32, such as trust and gentlemen’s agreements. He found that 
great effort is put into planning exchange performance, while planning for 
contingencies, non-performance and legal sanctions was not the focus of 
businesspeople (Macaulay 1963: 56–60). Second, businesspeople seldom used legal 
sanctions to adjust relationships or settle disputes. Lawyers and financial experts, in 
turn, were more prone to using contracts for planning and for referring to in cases of 
a change in circumstances or a dispute (Macaulay 1963: 60–62, 66).  
Regarding the non-use of contracts, Macaulay found that, in most cases, 
contracts were not needed, because other devices, such as careful planning of the 
primary obligation, industry customs, risk mitigation through securities, insurance, 
multi-sourcing supplier strategies, and effective non-legal sanctions33 served the 
functions of a contract (Macaulay 1963: 63). He also found that sometimes the use 
of contracts had detrimental consequences. Some of the interviewees felt that 
detailed negotiation could hinder the creation of a good, trusting relationship, 
especially if the focus of negotiation was on remote and unlikely contingencies. This 
could result in only getting to the letter of a contract without room for flexibility to 
adjust to actual circumstances (Macaulay 1963: 64). Thus, oftentimes, detailed 
contract negotiations were replaced by more flexible alternatives. Finally, relational 
governance was used more often than contracts and litigation to govern adjustments 
of exchanges. This was because contracting and litigation (or the threat of it) incur 
 
 
31  A full list of Macaulay’s publications can be found in Braucher et al. 2013. 
32  For more about relational governance mechanisms and their interplay with formal 
governance, see Sub-chapter 2.4. 
33  Examples of non-legal sanctions are an organization’s internal sanctions and 
reputational harms in cases of default (see Macaulay 1963: 63). See also Note 8 on 
informal enforcement means. 
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both monetary and non-monetary costs34 that often outweigh the anticipated gains 
(Macaulay 1963: 64–65). 
As for the use of contracts, Macaulay found that exchanges were contractually 
planned when it was believed that planning and a potential legal sanction would be 
more advantageous than disadvantageous (Macaulay 1963: 65). The second reason 
for contractual planning was the need of an organization involved in a business 
exchange to use the contract as an internal communication device (Macaulay 1963:  
65). Thirdly, contracts were used when it was likely that problems would occur 
(Macaulay 1963: 65). Finally, the last resort was to use or threaten to use legal 
sanctions to settle disputes when other devices did not work and when the gains were 
thought to outweigh the costs, or just to use legal sanctions to “get even”, even 
though the benefits did not necessarily outweigh the costs (Macaulay 1963: 66). 
After his seminal work in 1963, Macaulay has continued to study contractual 
reality and its implications for contract law and adjudication in his works on 
automobile manufacturers (e.g. Macaulay 1965, 1966a, 1973), consumer issues (e.g. 
Macaulay 1966b, 1979, 1989), and the real deal versus the paper deal (Macaulay 
2003).35 In addition, he has devoted a great deal of time to developing law school 
teaching and is well known for his work on law and society studies and ANLR36 (e.g. 
Braucher & Whitford 2013: xi–xii). In conclusion, Macaulay has shown, through his 
empirical work on contracts, that although contracts play an important role in 
governing business relationships, relational factors are also important. This does not, 
as some researchers have concluded, mean that contracts are unimportant to 
Macaulay, or that he would favor a neoformalistic contract law system or textualist 
adjudication.37 Rather, Macaulay feels that the classical and neoclassical academic 
models of contract and contract law do not reflect reality and calls for empirical 
research that is interested in the living law of contracts (Macaulay 1985: 466).  
 
 
34  Monetary costs include the costs of litigation, whereas non-monetary costs refer to, for 
example, the discontinuance of the exchange relationship, which is likely after a dispute 
(Macaulay 1963: 64–65). 
35  Macaulay’s 2003 article is probably his second most famous article. In it, he presents 
the ever-ongoing debate between the formalist contract law approach with textual 
interpretation and the rules-based contract law system and the realist approach with 
contextual interpretation and the standards-based contract law system. He argues that 
the real deal (the real exchange) is always more than just a paper deal (what is written 
in the formal contract document). Thus, he thinks that contract law should rest on 
standards rather than on rules, and interpretation should be based on contextual factors. 
According to Macaulay, a formalistic approach would be too simplistic for problems 
that occur in contractual disputes. 
36  For more about ANLR, see Sub-chapter 3.1. 
37  Macaulay is said to be the Lord High Executioner of the Contract is Dead Movement 
by Gilmore (for the Contract is Dead Movement, see Gilmore 1974). Macaulay himself 
refused the “honor”. See Macaulay 1985: 465–466. See also Smith & King 2009: 8. 
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2.3.2 Macneil and the relational contract theory 
The scholar most associated with the relational contract theory is Ian R. Macneil, 
who started to develop the theory already in the 1960s but only published his first 
articles on the subject in 1974.38 Over the years, Macneil has developed the theory 
to contain four main ideas. 
First, he argues that all transactions are embedded in complex relations, and that 
understanding any transaction requires understanding all the essential elements of 
these relations. Consequently, he calls for contextual analysis of transactions, both 
in economics and in contract law (Macneil 2000). 
Second, Macneil situates all transactions on an axis on which as-if-discrete 
transactions represent one end of the spectrum and relational transactions the other. 
Figure 1 places Williamson’s transactional attributes on the as-if-discrete––
relational ends of Macneil’s spectrum and provides examples of such contracts. 
 
Figure 1. As-if-discrete––relational spectrum with examples of contracts. 
Since purely discrete transactions are an oxymoron, Macneil uses the term as-if-
discrete transactions to refer to exchanges without many past, present or future social 
ties. These exchanges are abstract, presentiated statements of obligations with no 
focus on context (e.g. Macneil 2000: 895–896; Macaulay 2003: 64–65). In the 
context of this study, occasional purchase contracts for standard equipment/material 
are an example of a fairly discrete transaction. According to Williamson, these kinds 
of transactions are best governed by what Macneil describes as the system of 
classical contract law (Williamson 1979: 248–249). 
 
 
38  See Macneil 1974a, 1974b. 
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According to Macneil, although as-if-discrete transactions do exist, most 
exchanges are relational. These exchanges are typically not specific or precise 
allocations of risk but involve complex transactions and span across undefined time 
frames. They are agreements to cooperate to achieve mutually desired goals, include 
flexible adjustment possibilities in cases of changes in circumstances, and emphasize 
solidarity and reciprocity (Macaulay 2003: 64–65).  Depending on, for example, the 
duration of the transaction as well as on the investments required by the transaction, 
these transactions would be best governed by either the system of neoclassical 
contract law (as is the case with the project contracts in Figure 1) or by the relational 
contract law system (Williamson 1979: 249–253). In Figure 1, franchise contracts 
represent these kinds of relational contracts. 
Third, Macneil believes that general principles––common contract behavioral 
patterns and norms––are present in every contract law system. These norms are: 
1. Role integrity: The pattern of behavior expected from a contracting party. 
Role integrity requires consistency and involves internal conflict between 
self-interest and contractual solidarity. Roles are often multiple and thus, 
complex. 
2. Reciprocity or mutuality: The principle of getting something back for 
something given. 
3. Implementation of planning: Planning the substance of exchange or the 
processes that structure exchange relations, for example. 
4. Effectuation of consent: The exercise of choice in a contract by giving a 
contracting party the power to limit the other party’s future choices. 
5. Flexibility: Capacity for change, either by processes within the transaction 
or by deliberately limiting the scope of the transaction. 
6. Contractual solidarity: The norm of holding exchanges together. The 
sources of contractual solidarity are both internal––the complex webs of 
interdependence created by the relation itself––and external––the laws 
and customs created by the society surrounding the exchange relations. 
7. The restitution, reliance and expectation interests (“linking norms”): A 
collection of principles that link the other norms to the rules of the contract 
and the contract damages. 
8. The creation and restraint of power: Capacity to create, restrain and 
change power relations by contract. Power relations can be legal, political, 
social, or economic. 
9. Propriety of means: Norms concerning how things are done. 
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10. Harmonization with the social matrix: The idea that the norms of society 
(supracontract norms) must at least partially become the norms of the 
exchange relations occurring within that society.39 
Although all exchanges are situated somewhere on the as-if-discrete––relational 
axis, the ten behavioral patterns and norms occur all along the spectrum. Some norms 
are, however, more appropriate for as-if-discrete transactions and others to relational 
transactions. For example, while the norms of implementation of planning and 
effectuation of consent may be more visible in as-if-discrete deals, role integrity and 
harmonization with the social matrix can be more important in relational 
transactions.40 However, if the common contract norms are inadequately served, 
exchange relations of any kind will fall apart (e.g. Macneil 1974b, 1983, 2000). 
Finally, Macneil calls for a reunification of contract law that would be based on 
the common contract norms. He regards this kind of relational contract law system 
as more effective than the neoclassical contract law system for implementing 
contract justice (Macneil 1974b, 2000). 
For quite some time, Macneil’s relational contract theory only had a limited 
visible impact on adjudication and contract law doctrine.41 It was criticized for being 
both an overly abstract and unnecessarily detailed account of groups of contracts that 
require contextualization. Beyond identifying a subgroup of relational contracts, the 
theory had no real use for contract doctrine (e.g. Feinman 2000: 737–740). 
 
 
39  Originally, Macneil presented five common contract behavioral patterns and norms in 
Macneil 1974b: 809. Later, he added new norms and patterns that are present in all 
contracts and contract law systems. See Macneil 1978, 1980, 1983. For more about the 
common contract norms, see Macneil 1980: 39–59; Macneil 1983. 
40  In addition to the common contract norms, Macneil (1980) presents a discrete norm 
that the as-if-discrete transactions follow, and relational norms that are exercised in 
relational contracts. The discrete norm is an intensification of two common contract 
behaviors––the implementation of planning and the effectuation of consent. It enhances 
discreteness and presentiation. Relational norms are role integrity, the preservation of 
the relation, the harmonization of relational conflict, and supracontract norms. 
Relational norms are intensifications of three common contract norms in particular––
role integrity, contractual solidarity, and harmonization with the social matrix. See 
Macneil 1980: 59–70. See also Macneil 2000: 896–897. 
41  Tan (2019) deals with relational contract theory’s potential doctrinal impact and argues that 
the theory has the potential to influence the doctrine on three levels, which he describes as 
follows: “(i) re-interpretive relationalism, a smaller-scale intervention which works by 
altering normative meaning without performing any surgery on the explicit face of concepts 
and rules; (ii) re-orientative relationalism, which is more visible and involves making 
explicit salience and additive changes to the content, structure and priority of rules and 
standards within a doctrine; and (iii) reconstructive relationalism, which involves larger-
scale changes at the level of doctrinal categories and taxonomies.” (Tan 2019: 119). 
Although Tan sees potential in relational contract theory’s call for contextualist 
interpretation, he also points to the challenges of the theory’s suggestions. 
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Gradually, however, the relational approach has sneaked into common law courts42, 
contract law scholarship43, and even contracting practice44. Next, I discuss law and 
economics research that is especially inspired by Macaulay’s work and is relevant to 
my research. 
2.3.3 Relationalism in law and economics 
After its initial awkwardness, Macaulay’s and Macneil’s work has inspired many 
scholars in the field of law, economics and organizational and management 
 
 
42  For example, English courts have started to refer to relational contracts, especially after the 
seminal case of Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). 
In many of the cases, however, relational contract is conceptualized differently from the 
academic conceptualization of relational contract. Amey Birmingham Highways Ltd v 
Birmingham City Council [2018] EWCA Civ 264 was a game changer in this respect, 
bringing English case law conception closer to the academic conception of relational 
contract. Following this development, in Bates v Post Office Ltd (no 3) [2019] EWHC 606 
(QB), the court listed nine non-exhaustive, indicative characteristics of relational contracts. 
It also mentioned factors that are not relevant to determining whether the contract in 
question is relational or not. The court ruled that in the case of a relational contract, there is 
an implied, overriding duty of good faith. This departs from English contract law, in which, 
contrary to the US and many civil law jurisdictions, no general duty of good faith exists. 
Examples of more recent cases include UTB LLC v Sheffield United & Ors [2019] EWHC 
914 (Ch), Taqa Bratani Ltd & Ors v Rockrose UKCS8 LLC [2020] EWHC 58 (Comm), 
Essex County Council v UBB Waste (Essex) Ltd (Rev 1) [2020] EWHC 1581 (TCC), and 
Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd v Lufthansa Technik AG [2020] EWHC 1789 (Ch). For more 
about the UK case law on relational contracts, see Tan 2019. 
43  For American contract law scholarship inspired by the relationalists, see Sub-chapter 2.3.3. 
In Finland, a number of contract law scholars have studied and conceptualized contracts 
similarly to the relationalists, and their influence is also shown in contract law teaching and 
adjudication. For example, Pöyhönen has conceptualized the contract as a process, which 
means that contractual duties neither emerge nor become fulfilled at a certain moment. 
Thus, the analysis of contractual rights and duties has to consider the substantial dimension, 
the time dimension, and the personal dimension of the exchange. See e.g. Pöyhönen 1988: 
211–231; Pöyhönen 2003: 144–152. Soili Nystén-Haarala (1998) shares the process view 
in her dissertation on long-term contracts which focuses on the two different worlds of, first, 
contract law, and second, contracting. According to Nystén-Haarala, “the purpose is to 
emphasize that designing good contracts and governing them efficiently is so important that 
it should be understood as a part of contract law thinking” (Nystén-Haarala 1998: 15–16). 
Similarly to Nystén-Haarala, Macneil “include[s] contract-itself-in-action within the realm 
of law, as it is the foundation on which doctrines and formal legal processes are based, and 
from which they cannot be sensibly separated” (Macneil 1981: 1060, Note 120). Nystén-
Haarala is a proponent of the proactive contracting approach, which is also inspired by the 
works of Macaulay and Macneil. The proactive contracting approach was initiated by 
Finnish contract law scholar and practitioner Helena Haapio. For more about the proactive 
contracting approach, see Sub-chapter 2.6. 
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studies.45 In the legal field, Macaulay’s work in particular has inspired law and 
economics scholars who have been interested in, for example, the relationships 
between public contract law and private ordering, the relationships between legal 
sanctions and non-legal, reputational-based sanctions, and the question of contract 
law system that best meets the expectations of the contracting parties. Essentially, 
these so called economic relationalists call for a neoformalistic contract law system 
and methods of adjudication (Tan 2019:100–102), but some law and economics 
scholars call for a combination of formalist and contextualist adjudication (e.g. 
Badawi 2009; Jennejohn 2010, 2016). 
For my research, three theories that have been developed within the realm of law 
and economics studies are especially important.46 All of them relate to the interaction 
between formal and informal governance in the context of innovation relationships 
that are subject to pervasive uncertainty (Hadfield & Bozovic 2016).  
First, building on their earlier work on the relationship between formal and 
informal enforcement, Gilson et al. (2009, 2010, 2013, 2014) introduced the theory 
of a braided contract that combines elements from both informal and formal 
governance. Essentially, in braided agreements47, parties agree on the processes of 
information exchange and collaboration, thereby complementing informal 
governance and endogenizing trust. According to Gilson et al. (2009), these 
techniques facilitate transparency in information exchange, help screen for 
 
 
44  In contracting practice, the professional association for Commercial and Contract 
Management, World Commerce and Contracting (WorldCC, formerly known as the 
International Association for Contract & Commercial Management, IACCM), 
encourages organizations to use formal relational contracts in strategic and complex 
commercial exchanges. A white paper by the WorldCC, the University of Tennessee 
and the Lindahl Law Firm, introduces a model of a formal relational contract together 
with a five-step contracting process. See Frydlinger et al. 2016. This model is based on 
research carried out at the University of Tennessee, and a number of organizations have 
adopted it with good results. See e.g. Frydlinger et al. 2019; Frydlinger et al. 2020. 
Recently, the model has drawn wider attention in economics. See Frydlinger & Hart 
2020, which discusses the merits of the model and explains in economic terms why it 
works. 
45  Studies in the fields of organizational and management studies will be discussed in 
detail, especially in Sub-chapters 2.4 and 2.5. 
46  I do not, however, consider myself an economic relationalist, nor do I agree with 
economic relationalists’ assumptions that rational choice directs the behavior of 
commercial parties (Scott 2013: 118). Jennejohn’s (2016, 2020) and Gilson et al.’s 
(2009, 2010, 2013, 2014) theories in particular seem to be based on the ideas of rational 
decision-makers that design contracts purely on the basis of different kinds of exchange 
hazards. Both theories seem to overlook the human and cultural factors that influence 
contract design choices. 
47  Gilson et al. (2009, 2010) use the term “contract for innovation” to refer to a braided 
agreement. 
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opportunistic counterparties, and increase the switching costs––the costs incurred by 
switching a contracting partner. In their papers, they examine the braiding 
phenomenon in a variety of contexts, using many examples from real contracting 
practice. Moreover, they argue that since braiding is only one approach to harnessing 
opportunism, uncertainty and the scale of the markets in a specific exchange will 
determine whether or not braiding is used (Gilson et al. 2014). They also claim that 
courts should use low-powered sanctions in cases of breached braided agreements, 
because a high-powered sanction would crowd out the informal governance and 
vitiate the whole purpose of the braided contract.48  
Second, Jennejohn (2016, 2020) continues the work of Gilson et al. (2009, 2010, 
2013, 2014) in his two empirical papers but challenges the braiding thesis in part. 
First, he criticizes Gilson et al.’s argument of uncertainty and the scale of the markets 
that determine whether or not braiding is used. Jennejohn (2016, 2020) argues that 
in addition to market uncertainty and scale, alternative types of exchange hazards 
(such as technology spillovers and coordination problems) and different network 
types49 can influence contract design choices. Consequently, he argues that a 
multivalent approach explains certain aspects of innovation contracts’ designs better 
than the braiding thesis. According to Jennejohn (2016), multivalence can be in 
relation to both the exchange hazards that characterize innovation exchanges and the 
governance tools that respond to these multiple hazards. This also means that 
contract provisions that address a specific exchange hazard, such as the hold-up 
problem50, might either conflict or support other contract provisions, mitigating 
another exchange hazard.  He concludes that since different formal governance 
mechanisms can either substitute or complement each other, the relationship between 
formal and informal governance must be even more complex. Moreover, he 
speculates that the multivalent approach probably also extends to informal 
 
 
48  Low-powered sanctions refer to reliance damages as opposed to expectation damages. 
See Gilson et al. 2010: 1399, Note 60. 
49  Bernstein (2015) also explores the influence of networks – “a set of connections 
between individuals or between organizations” (Bernstein 2015: 599) – in the 
governance of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) procurement contracts. 
According to her, network governance reinforces the influences of governance 
mechanisms used in individual buyer-supplier relationships by, for example, 
broadening the self-enforcing range of contractual obligations and expanding the types 
of behavior that can be sanctioned through informal enforcement. She also suggests 
that in addition to transaction costs, network-related factors, such as the network 
structure, the network position of suppliers, and innovation needs, influence firms’ 
make-or-buy decisions. 
50  For the definition of the hold-up problem, see Note 28. 
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governance: For example, informal governance will likely affect not only hold-up 
problems, but also other types of exchange hazards.51 
Finally, in an interview study of high-level executives in non-innovation- and 
innovation-oriented companies, Hadfield & Bozovic (2016) found that in 
innovation-oriented exchanges, contracts were used as scaffolding. When a contract 
works as scaffolding, it “bridge[s] gaps and provide[s] just enough support for work 
on the underlying edifice to move forward” (Hadfield & Bozovic 2016: 1010). In 
this way, a contract serves as a classification institution, which refers to a set of rules 
that the practitioners can use to decide whether or not a contracting party’s concrete 
conduct is a breach. The classification institution relieves the parties of the need to 
specify a complex plan ex ante, because it provides rules that will guide the parties 
to determine ex post whether specific behavior is in accordance with the contract. If 
the behavior is classified as a breach, it triggers the imposition of informal 
enforcement mechanisms, such as early termination and reputational harm.  
All these three theories resemble the debate that has been ongoing in 
management studies for about two decades––the discussion of whether formal 
governance and relational governance substitute or complement each other. Despite 
this clear resemblance, the two research streams barely refer to one another.52 One 
reason for this might be that research in management studies, conceptualized as the 
relational view, criticizes TCE’s focus on opportunism and formal safeguards, which 
is exactly the approach that most law and economics studies take. Moreover, the 
focus of these legal studies is on governance by contract, whereas the focus of 
management scholars is on the informal governance mechanisms of exchanges. 
Next, I discuss this research in more depth. 
2.4 The relational view–––contracts and relational 
governance as substitutes or complements? 
As discussed in Sub-chapter 2.2, according to the logic of TCE, the governance mode 
of an exchange should be chosen on the basis of the transactional attributes that 
 
 
51  In addition to his papers discussed in detail here, Jennejohn has also developed a theory 
of generative contracting (see Jennejohn 2008). Building on Helper et al. (2000) in 
particular, Jennejohn argues that in situations in which firms embark on joint innovation 
that is characterized by unique, endogenous, and pervasive uncertainty, collaborators 
use generative contracts to institutionalize a learning process that consist of 
benchmarking, error detection/correction mechanisms and simultaneous engineering. 
These kinds of contracts, according to Jennejohn, “establish routines for uncovering 
problems, cooperatively fashioning solutions in real time, and, in so doing, further 
defining their [the contracting parties’] respective self-interests”(Jennejohn 2016: 322, 
Note 199). 
52  For exceptions, see e.g. Gilson et al. 2009; Jennejohn 2016. 
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create exchange hazards and give rise to opportunistic behavior. The more exchange 
hazards there are, the more formal safeguards are needed to prevent exploitation by 
a less principled (more opportunistic) party. In fact, according to Williamson, 
although trust is needed in exchanges, it can never totally exclude opportunism (e.g. 
Williamson 1985: 64–65). 
The relational view criticizes TCE’s focus on opportunism and formal 
safeguards53 and posits that in addition to formal safeguarding and control 
mechanisms, emphasis should be placed on the relational governance mechanisms 
that arise from the values and agreed-upon processes within a relationship and 
govern interorganizational relationships and their performance.  These mechanisms 
rely on the contracting parties’ informal structures and self-enforcement. Trust, 
solidarity and flexibility are examples of relational norms and governance methods 
(Poppo & Zenger 2002: 709–710; Lioliou et al. 2014: 505; Cao & Lumineau 2015: 
17). 
Initially, the relational view challenged the perspective of TCE, which regards 
contracts and the safeguards they create as having a positive impact on exchanges 
because they allow them to occur and continue on a long-term basis despite exchange 
hazards (Rich et al. forthcoming: 6). In effect, researchers who supported the so-
called substitution view suggested that contracts have a negative impact on 
exchanges and exchange relationships, and that relational governance is the most 
effective way to minimize transaction costs and add value. As a result, relational 
governance, rather than contracts, should be used to govern exchanges (e.g. Gulati 
1995; Ghosal & Moran 1996; Dyer 1997; Uzzi 1997; Dyer & Singh 1998). The 
proponents of the substitution view went as far as to claim that the combined use of 
relational governance and formal governance is fundamentally problematic, and that 
formal governance can even hinder the proper, functional use of relational 
governance and undermine the development of trust (e.g. Dyer & Singh 1998). 
In 2002, Laura Poppo and Todd Zenger published an article that contrasted 
sharply with the substitution view (Poppo & Zenger 2002). For example, they found 
a positive correlation between increased contractual complexity, increased relational 
governance, and exchange performance. Thus, they argued that formal governance 
and relational governance work as complements rather than substitutes. They 
observed that, especially in the early phases of collaboration, contracts facilitate the 
development of trust by narrowing the domain around which parties can be 
opportunistic. Likewise, relational governance complements contracts when their 
limits are met, in the case of a conflict, for example (Poppo & Zenger 2002: 721–
 
 
53  Research on behavioral economics partly supports this critique. For example, the 
famous ultimatum game indicates that while humans are opportunistic, they are also 
fair. See e.g. Kahneman 2011: 305–308. 
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722). In these situations, relational governance directs parties to behave flexibly and 
collaboratively rather than in a self-maximizing way (Schepker et al. 2014: 201).  
After Poppo and Zenger’s seminal work, the complementarity role of contracts 
and relational governance has been supported by a number of other studies (e.g. 
Mayer & Argyres 2004; Ryall & Sampson 2009; Li et al. 2010; Mellewigt et al. 
2012; Cao & Lumineau 2015; Lumineau 2017; Shen et al. 2019).54 Proponents of 
the complementary view see the two governance mechanisms as enabling 
mechanisms on the one hand and compensating mechanisms on the other. For 
example, as enablers, clear contracts facilitate the development of relational 
governance by increasing mutual confidence, reducing information asymmetry, 
improving mutual understanding, and supporting trust. As compensators, contracts 
also compensate for the limitations of relational governance (Huber et al. 2013).  
Even though the relational view has a more comprehensive understanding of 
organizational governance mechanisms than TCE, it has been criticized for being 
one dimensional (e.g. Schepker et al. 2014: 218). Moreover, like TCE, the relational 
view assumes that contracts are only used for safeguarding—for preventing negative 
events from occurring (Rich et al. forthcoming: 7). According to recent research, 
these limitations have resulted in the dichotomous debate of the substitution and the 
complementary roles of the two governance mechanisms even though this 
relationship seems to be more complicated (Ryall & Sampson 2009; Bertrandias et 
al. 2010; Huber et al. 2013; Cao & Lumineau 2015; Weber & Bauman 2019).  
For example, Huber et al. (2013) argue that the relationship between contractual 
and relational governance oscillates between complementarity and substitution. 
Poppo & Chen (2018) corroborate this in the context of classical and neoclassical 
contracting by arguing that although trust supports the development of contracts and 
vice versa, and although contracts and trust positively relate to performance in 
neoclassical contracting, the situation is less consistent in classical contracting. This 
is because of the different levels of risk involved in classical and neoclassical 
contracting; a classical, complete contract has little economic risk and thus, relational 
governance may substitute the contract. With neoclassical contracts––and here 
uncertainty enters the picture––if one party harms the other by failing to deliver the 
agreed-upon deal, the economic risk is significant. Thus, if trust substitutes a 
neoclassical contract, it means that parties forgo crafting a more complex contract 
that puts in place processes to resolve adjustments and disputes. 
In connection to this, Cao & Lumineau (2015: 19) argue that different types of 
contracts can have distinct effects on relational governance: i.e. controlling contracts 
can have negative impacts on it, whereas coordinative contracts can facilitate its 
 
 
54  For comprehensive meta-analyses, see Poppo & Cheng 2018 and Cao & Lumineau 
2015. 
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development.55 In effect, research has begun to take notice of the different functions 
of contracts and their interplay with relational governance and exchange 
performance (Schepker et al. 2014; Cao & Lumineau 2015). This research is 
discussed next. 
2.5 The manifold functions of contracts 
The functional approach to contracting grew from the relational view and its critique 
of TCE’s structural view of contracts and its focus on the safeguarding function. It 
was first conceptualized by Schepker et al. (2014), although the core elements of the 
approach emerged already at the beginning of the 2000s. The approach underlines, 
first, that there are other reasons to choose a specific governance structure than 
transaction costs or the threat of opportunism, and that various issues affect this 
decision (Schepker et al. 2014: 201–204). Second, the functional approach 
emphasizes other coexisting functionalities of contracts, such as coordination and 
adaptation, together with the safeguarding function56 (Reuer & Ariño 2007; 
Lumineau & Malhotra 2011; Mellewigt et al. 2012; Schepker et al. 2014; Lumineau 
2017; Chen et al. 2018; Schilke & Lumineau 2018). Coordinative clauses organize 
the relationship of the parties, tasks and communication throughout the contract’s 
life and include provisions for communication and monitoring (Mellewigt et al. 
2012: 850–851; Schepker et al. 2014: 211–212). The adaptation function, in turn, 
refers to contractual techniques such as a single contract clause or a combination of 
various clauses, which are used to adapt the relationship in response to possible 
endogenous or exogenous changes in the transaction. Examples of adaptive terms 
are price adjustment clauses, change management clauses, force majeure clauses, 
and contract termination clauses (Mellewigt et al. 2012: 852–853; Schepker et al., 
2014: 212–213; Chen et al. 2018: 475–476). 
 
 
55  In the legal field, contract types refer to the classification of contracts according to their 
distinct characteristics, e.g. their parties, i.e. business-to-business (B2B) contracts, 
business-to-government (B2G) contracts, business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts, and 
consumer-to-consumer (C2C) contracts. Contracts can also be classified by their 
content. A sale of goods contract, a lease, and an employment contract are examples of 
different types of contracts classified by their content. Moreover, contracts can be 
classified by their term (a one-time or a short-term contract vs. a long-term contract). 
For the different contract types in the Finnish context, see Saarnilehto & Annola 2018: 
12–15 and Halila & Hemmo (2008). In organizational and management studies that I 
refer to in this dissertation, different types of contracts refer to the different functions 
of contracts. For the different functions of contracts, see Sub-chapter 2.5. 
56  Instead of using the term contractual safeguard, some researchers refer to a contract’s 
control dimension or function. See e.g. Lumineau & Malhotra 2011; Malhotra & 
Lumineau 2011; Cao & Lumineau 2015; Lumineau 2017. 
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Researchers have studied the relationship between organizational learning and 
the use of different contractual functions (Mayer & Argyres 2004; Mellewigt et al. 
2012), and the relationship between transaction attributes, contractual function, and 
organizations’ contract design capabilities (Argyres & Mayer 2007; Shen et al. 
2019). Studies have also examined the effects of various contractual functions on 
trust and distrust (Malhotra & Lumineau 2011; Lumineau 2017; Shen et al. 2019) 
and on the level of conflict in alliance relationships (Schilke & Lumineau 2018). In 
addition, studies have focused on the relationship between contract detail, contract 
function, and the selection of a rights-based vs. interests-based approach to dispute 
resolution (Lumineau & Malhotra 2011). Finally, researchers have been interested 
in how prior ties influence the use of various contract functions, finding that prior 
relationships have a stabilizing or a slightly positive effect on the level of 
safeguarding clauses (Mayer & Argyres 2004; Reuer & Ariño 2007; Ryall & 
Sampson 2009; Mellewigt et al. 2012). The results concerning the relationship 
between prior ties and the use of adaptive and coordinative contract clauses are, in 
contrast, conflicting (Mayer & Argyres 2004; Reuer & Ariño 2007; Ryall & 
Sampson 2009; Mellewigt et al. 2012; Cao & Lumineau 2015; Wang et al. 2017). 
For example, Reuer and Ariño (2007) found that prior ties decreased the use of 
coordinative clauses but not the use of safeguarding clauses. In contrast, Wang et al. 
(2017), focusing on the distinct effects of the various contractual functions on 
cooperative behavior and on the relationship between prior interactions and the 
functions, found that although prior interactions increased the use of coordinative 
contract clauses, they did not affect the use of contractual controls and adaptation 
clauses. 
The functional approach to contracting has attracted scholars in management 
studies, but has only recently gained attention in contract law scholarship (e.g. 
Nystén-Haarala et al. 2010; Viljanen et al. 2018a; Viljanen et al. 2018b; Viljanen et 
al. 2020; Huovinen forthcoming; Laurikainen-Klami forthcoming). Most of these 
studies embrace the proactive contracting approach that was founded in the Nordic 
countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g. Pohjonen 2002; Berger-Walliser 
2012). The proactive contracting approach shares similar ideas with the relational 
contract theory but is more practice oriented and offers concrete tools for 
operationalizing the ideas of the relationalists in the context of contract design. I next 
discuss this approach in more detail. 
2.6 The proactive contracting approach 
The proactive contracting approach was initiated by legal scholar and practitioner 
Helena Haapio in her 1998 publication “Quality Improvement through Proactive 
Contracting: Contracts are too Important to be left to Lawyers!”. After this, a handful 
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of Finnish scholars and practitioners joined forces and published the first book on 
proactive contracting.57 They also founded the Nordic School of Proactive Law and 
the Proactive ThinkTank (Haapio 2013: 39).58 Conferences on the proactive 
approach have been held since 2003, and have resulted in the publication of 
proceedings, including three books.59 
According to Haapio (1998), proactive contracting refers to:  
“…recognizing and making use of contracts and contracting processes as 
planning tools to guide and support the success of your business. It provides the 
support needed to identify opportunities in time to take advantage of them––and 
potential problems in time to take preventive action. Proactive contracting 
provides tools and techniques for the early detection of gaps, traps and problems 
and the prevention of negative surprises” (Haapio 1998: 246). 
 Although the proactive contracting approach was initiated and developed mainly by 
legal scholars, it has grown into a multidisciplinary, practice-oriented research 
approach that is interested in the ways in which contracts can be used to promote 
business success (e.g. Haapio 2013; Kujala et al. 2015; Nuottila et al. 2016). Thus, its 
focus is not, as in conventional contract law scholarship or even in the many works of 
law and economics scholars, on interpreting contracts or contract law ex post, in cases 
of disputes.60 On the contrary, the proactive contracting approach focuses on the ex 
ante use of contracts in business (e.g. Haapio 2013). In fact, as described by Soile 
Pohjonen, a co-founder of the proactive contracting approach, the goal of proactive 
contracting is that “the contracting parties achieve the goal of their collaboration in 
accordance with their will. This requires, above all, a careful investigation of their goal 
and will, and the skill to create a clear and legally robust framework for their 
implementation” (Pohjonen 2002: v, translation by Haapio 2013: 39). 
The proactive contracting approach has two dimensions: preventive and 
promotive.61 In the context of law, the preventive dimension is based on Preventive 
 
 
57  See Pohjonen 2002. 
58  See Nordic School of Proactive Law. 
59  See Wahlgren 2006; Haapio 2008; Berger-Walliser & Østergaard 2012. For a 
comprehensive history of the proactive contracting approach, see Berger-Walliser 
2012, with references. 
60  According to Kujala et al. (2015), this limitation of conventional contract law 
scholarship stems from legal centralism, “which approaches every problem from the 
point of view of courts or legislation.” (Kujala et al. 2015: 95). See also Nystén-Haarala 
1998: 204. 
61  The preventive and promotive dimensions are grounded in RFT (Siedel & Haapio 2010: 




Law, introduced by US attorney and law professor Louis M. Brown in 1950 (Brown 
1950). In the same way as the proactive contracting approach, the focus of the 
preventive law movement is on the future, and the goal is to use the law to prevent 
problems and disputes from occurring (e.g. Haapio 2013: 38–39). However, the 
proactive contracting approach adds a proactive dimension to Preventive Law, 
thereby focusing on enabling success and enhancing opportunities through law and 
contracts. Being proactive “involves acting in anticipation, taking control and self-
initiation” (Rekola & Haapio 2011: 382). 
In the proactive approach, the role of a contract expands from being merely a 
legal instrument to also covering the managerial functions of a contract. Legal and 
managerial functions are intertwined and strive for the same goal––that the parties 
achieve the benefit of their bargain (Haapio 2013: 30). In other words, like the 
functional approach to contracting and unlike conventional contract law scholarship, 
which focuses on the legal functions of contracts, the proactive contracting approach 
recognizes that contracts serve many functions. Researchers have conceptualized 
contracts as, for example, a process62 (e.g. Nystén-Haarala 1998; Nystén-Haarala et 
al. 2010; Kujala et al. 2015); tools for planning and managing business, relationships 
and collaboration (e.g. Pohjonen & Visuri 2008; Berger-Walliser et al. 2011; Kujala 
et al. 2015; Nuottila et al. 2016; Nuottila & Nystén-Haarala 2019); blueprints; the 
visible scripts63 and roadmaps of the deal (e.g. Haapio & Haavisto 2005; Rekola & 
Haapio 2011; Nuottila & Nystén-Haarala 2019); boundary objects (e.g. Passera et al. 
2013; Passera & Haapio 2013; Pohjonen & Koskelainen 2012); and as a source of 
competitive advantage (e.g. Barton 2008;  Siedel & Haapio 2010; Siedel & Haapio 
2011; DiMatteo et al. 2012; Passera 2017). For instance, Haapio & Haavisto (2005) 
argue that good-quality contracts serve as visible scripts for the contracting parties 
and are instruments for: 
1. Coordinating and managing business, projects and commitments; 
2. Creating, allocating and protecting value, and realizing benefits; 
3. Communication, motivation and control; 
 
 
62  As discussed earlier in Note 43, the concept of the “contract as a process” also exists in 
Finnish contract law literature (see e.g. Pöyhönen 1988). However, the emphasis of the 
proactive contracting approach is not, as in the Finnish contract law literature, on the 
legally binding effect of a contract, which can both develop and fade away gradually, 
but on the contract as a managerial tool, throughout the exchange (Kujala et al. 2015: 
96). 
63  The contract as a script metaphor was introduced by Suchman (2003) who argues that 
contracts should be understood and studied as both technical and cultural social 
artifacts. The script metaphor also includes the technical and symbolic sides (Suchman 
2003:114). 
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4. Sharing, minimizing and managing risks; 
5. Preventing problems and controlling and resolving disputes. (Haapio & 
Haavisto 2005, translation by Haapio 2013: 29) 
In addition to the legal-managerial functions of contracts, the proactive contract 
approach highlights the need for cross-professional collaboration in contract 
drafting. Haapio (2006a: 159; 2013: 37) uses the visual metaphor of a puzzle to refer 
to the different parts of contracts that must be consistent and coordinated throughout 
the contracting process, from planning through drafting to implementation. As can 
be seen in the following figure (Figure 2), the legal part is but one piece of the puzzle: 
The technical, implementation and financial parts are equally important pieces. This 
view changes the lawyer’s job from that of a fighter in court or the drafter of a clear, 
enforceable legal contract that safeguards a company’s interests against other 
contracting parties to a designer that needs to collaborate and communicate with 
multiple user groups and craft contracts for varying information needs (e.g. Haapio 
2006b; Nystén-Haarala et al. 2010; Siedel & Haapio 2010; Haapio 2013; Kujala et 
al. 2015; Nuottila et al. 2016). 
 
Figure 2. Contract Puzzle: Contract documents and their contents. © Helena Haapio. Used with 
permission. 
Research on proactive contracting has focused on empirical studies of contracts-in-
action, i.e. how contracts work in actual business practices. A number of researchers 
have adopted the approach when studying long-term contracts (Nystén-Haarala 
Anna Hurmerinta-Haanpää 
42 
1998), life-cycle contracting (Nystén-Haarala et al. 2010), contract simplification 
(e.g. Waller et al. 2016; Finnegan 2021), and contracts and contracting in project 
business (e.g. Kujala et al. 2015; Nuottila et al. 2016; Nuottila 2019; Nuottila & 
Nystén-Haarala 2019). Over time, the proactive approach has expanded to include 
not only contracts but also other fields of law, and today, the approach is applied in, 
for example, law for competitive advantage research and law and strategy research 
(e.g. Siedel & Haapio 2010; Berger-Walliser et al. 2011)64, research on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) (e.g. Pohjonen 2009; Park & Berger-Walliser 2015; 
Berger-Walliser et al. 2016; Berger-Walliser & Shrivastava 2015), and public 
procurement contracting research (Pohjonen & Koskelainen 2012). Notably, the 
approach has been endorsed by The European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC) in relation to developing better regulation in the European Union (EU) 
(EESC 2009). Recently, the approach has been applied particularly in the context of 
contract design research.65 This research, with its special focus on contract 
visualization and contract framing, is discussed next. 
2.7 Contract design research 
Contract design research, as understood in this study, is informed by the proactive 
contracting approach on the one hand and by design research and methodologies on 
the other.66 Consequently, contract design research uses design-based methods, such 
as experimenting, prototyping, and user testing, to study contracting and contract 
documents. Moreover, it focuses on the entire contract document, including content, 
 
 
64  The law for competitive advantage/law and strategy movements in the US share many 
similarities with the proactive contracting approach. In fact, the proactive contracting 
approach can be considered an integral part of astute legal strategy. For law and 
strategy/law for competitive advantage research, see e.g. Bird 2008; Bird 2011; Bird & 
Orozco 2014; Orozco 2020. For a comparison of the European proactive law movement 
and the American law for competitive advantage/law and strategy movement, see 
Siedel & Haapio 2010. 
65  In addition to research on contract design, the proactive contracting approach has 
recently been applied in, for example, research on legal design in the context of 
transparency design, content design, and proactive visualization. See e.g. Rossi & 
Haapio 2019; Haapio et al. forthcoming. 
66  A number of distinguished law and economics scholars study contract design choices 
from the perspective of, for example, economic efficiency and transaction costs. See 
e.g. the studies referred to in Sub-chapter 2.3.3. Most scholars representing the TCE 
perspective, the relational view, and the functional approach to contracting are also 
interested in contract design issues. None of these scholars, however, employ the 
proactive contracting approach or use design-based methods in their research. In other 
words, the context of their studies is contract design but their theoretical approach, as 
well as their methods, differ from the theoretical framework and methods used in the 
contract design research that is discussed in this Sub-chapter. 
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structure, language, and presentation, as well as the design of the contracting process, 
from a user-centric perspective (e.g. Haapio 2013; Berger-Walliser et al. 2017; 
Passera 2017; Finnegan 2021). In the context of contract design, user-centricity 
means that the needs of the people who use contracts are the driving forces behind 
the contract design process (e.g. Passera & Haapio 2013: 40–43; Berger-Walliser et 
al. 2017: 356). This dissertation examines both the contracting process (specifically 
Publications I and II) and contract documents (specifically Publication IV) and 
focuses mainly on the design of contract content (the functions) and language (the 
framing). 
The pioneers of contract design research67 argue that current contracting 
practices and contract documents are dysfunctional because of the classical legal 
paradigm dominating both research and practice, which is reinforced by lawyers who 
draft contracts from old templates68 (e.g. Haapio 2013; Passera 2017). Moreover, 
they believe that contract design is the key to improving contract clarity and 
functionality and enhancing collaboration among the contracting parties, their 
lawyers and those implementing the contract (e.g. Passera et al. forthcoming). 
Consequently, contract design research aims to find answers to questions such as 
how to help users better comprehend the framework of a complex contract or how 
to transfer the information included in contracts to facilitate collaborative knowledge 
work (e.g. Passera 2017).  
Recently, contract design researchers have been interested in, for example, the 
impact of contract design on the legal community (Cummins forthcoming), the 
opportunities and challenges of contract design in the context of consumer (online) 
contracts (Waller forthcoming; Mik forthcoming) and standard contracts in banking 
and finance sectors (Kaave 2019a, 2019b, 2020). Another trending research area is 
the opportunities and challenges resulting from merging contract design with smart 
contracts and contract automation tools (Rich et al. forthcoming; White 
 
 
67  Haapio and Passera are “partners in crime”: They have co-authored a number of 
articles, book chapters, and conference papers, and worked together in various contract 
design jams and projects. 
68  Haapio (2013: 49–52) argues that most contracts are compiled of old contract templates 
that are put together by lawyers who are trained to prepare for worst case scenarios, 
minimize liability exposure and maximize benefits when using the contract in court. 
Anderson (2020) also argues that attorneys use the precedent heuristic—the copying of 
past transactions—to economize on the cost of writing contracts. Moreover, as reading, 
processing and understanding the precedent documents involve costs, attorneys often 
rely on the perceived “wisdom of the crowd” embodied in a standardized document 
(the cognition constraint). Finally, as the search for an appropriate precedent incurs 
costs, attorneys search local rather than global precedents (local search bias). According 
to Anderson, these three elements result in a path-dependent contract drafting process 
and miscalibrated contracts. 
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forthcoming). Moreover, researchers have proposed practical and innovative 
solutions to enhance the usability and comprehension of contracts (Haapio & Hagan 
2016; Passera 2017; Finnegan 2021; Henschel forthcoming; Jeyakodi & Gelting-Ros 
forthcoming; Passera et al. forthcoming). For example, Haapio & Hagan (2016), 
Passera (2017), and Passera et al. (forthcoming) propose a pattern approach––the use 
of “reusable models of a solution to a commonly occurring problem”69 (Haapio & 
Hagan 2016: 381)––to build common interdisciplinary knowledge in the specialized 
field of contract design and to make contracts easier to understand (Haapio & Hagan 
2016; Passera et al. forthcoming). Another example is the work of Milva Finnegan 
(2021), in which she proposes that organizations adopt three distinct contract design 
methods (a user-based building block approach to contract structure design, a 
controlled contract language, and contract visualizations) to reduce contract 
complexity and develop user-friendly contracts to support successful business 
outcomes. 
Like Finnegan (2021), many contract design researchers suggest contract 
visualization–– “the use of diagrams, images, and visually structured layouts to make 
contracts more searchable, readable, and understandable” (Passera 2017: 19)––as a 
tool to improve contract quality and user-experience and to enhance collaboration 
among the contracting parties. Initially, Haapio and her colleagues proposed using 
contracts as visible scripts (Haapio & Haavisto 2005) and as road maps of the deal, 
and productizing and visualizing them to facilitate communication and collaboration 
(Rekola & Haapio 2011). Since then, the pace of contract visualization research, as 
well as its attraction in practice, has increased tremendously. Recently, scholars have 
been interested in the specific opportunities and challenges related to the use of 
contract visualizations (Kohlmeier & Beelen forthcoming) and the ways in which 
traditional concepts of contract interpretation can be applied to images in contracts 
(Haapio et al. 2020; Annola et al. forthcoming). Moreover, contract visualization 
research has expanded from visualization in contracts (e.g. timelines and other visual 
aids) and visualization about contracts (contract handbooks) to visualization as 
contracts (e.g. comic contracts, see de Rooy 2018; Baasch Andersen & de Rooy 
forthcoming; Murray forthcoming) and visualization for contracts (visualization 
tools used in negotiations and contract design processes). 
One study that has been particularly influential in my research is Passera’s (2017) 
dissertation, which focuses on contract visualization and its impacts on contract 
 
 
69  Interestingly, in the context of learning theory and contracts, Smith & King (2009) 
consider contracts to be “routine solutions to common problems faced by 
organizations” (Smith & King 2009: 31). However, over time, contracts can become 
increasingly less optimal solutions to specific problems (Smith & King 2009: 33). This 
is especially the case with contract templates. See also Note 68 and Sub-chapter 5.4. 
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comprehension and user experience. In addition to concrete solutions70 for better 
contract comprehension and effective contract design practices, her study addresses 
the questions of why and how to use contract visualizations, and what approaches 
facilitate the adoption of contract visualizations in organizations’ everyday 
business.71 In addition, Passera’s study contributes to the emerging discussions on 
the social and psycho-cognitive effects of contract framing by providing evidence 
that contract creators deliberately seek to frame information in ways that are more 
likely to foster collaborative, open and value-maximizing relationships (Passera et 
al. 2016; Passera 2017: 162).  Indeed, a growing number of researchers have become 
interested in contract framing and its influences on exchange relationships, most of 
them focusing specifically on the connections between contract framing and 
regulatory focus. Next, I expand on this research.  
2.8 Contract framing research 
Studies that apply RFT to contracting are interested in different contract frames, their 
relation to personal and organizational regulatory focus, and their role in shaping 
exchange partners’ interpretations and behavior and the interorganizational 
relationship (Rich et al. forthcoming: 1).72 
Regulatory focus refers to different strategic means that people use to approach 
pleasure and avoid pain.73 The concept was introduced by professor of psychology 
and business, Tory Higgins. According to Higgins, people have two kinds of 
regulatory focuses: preventive and promotive. People with promotion focus are 
inclined to utilize approach strategic means in order to attain their goals, while 
people with prevention focus tend to use avoidance strategic means in order to attain 
their goals (e.g. Higgins et al. 2001: 4). Regulatory focus also influences the way in 
which people interpret their goals: a promotive regulatory focus leads to the 
interpretation of a goal as maximal (meeting it would be ideal), whereas a preventive 
 
 
70  Passera proposes that organizations adopt a pattern approach to contracting. She also 
presents six visual patterns for contracts that are, according to her, the most distinctive, 
recurrent and widely applicable: timelines, flowcharts, tables, swimlanes, companion 
icons, and delivery diagrams. See e.g. Passera 2017: 124. See also Haapio & Passera 
forthcoming. 
71  In particular, Passera encourages organizations to use design pattern libraries, visual 
templates, and/or automation tools to facilitate the adoption of contract visualizations. 
See Passera 2017: 160–161. 
72  For a comprehensive review on research on the relationship between contract framing 
and regulatory focus, see Rich et al. forthcoming. 
73  Peoples’ motivation to approach pleasure and avoid pain is called the hedonic principle. 




regulatory focus leads to the interpretation of a goal as minimal (something that must 
be met). Consequently, people experience different feelings when meeting or not 
meeting their goals, depending on their regulatory focus: Promotive focus leads to 
low-intensity negative emotions such as disappointment if the goal is not met, and 
high-intensity positive emotions such as happiness if the goal is met. Preventive 
focus, in turn, induces high-intensity negative emotions such as agitation if the goal 
is not met, and low-intensity positive emotions such as calmness if the goal is met. 
Although people have a dispositional or chronic tendency to view the world from 
either a prevention or a promotion perspective, this tendency can be overridden by a 
situationally or contextually induced regulatory focus (e.g. Higgins et al. 1997; 
Higgins et al. 2001). This means that preventive-framed statements may induce a 
prevention focus and promotive-framed statements a promotion focus (e.g. Roney et 
al. 1995; Shah et al. 1998; Weber & Bauman 2019). Finally, organizations may have 
their own regulatory focus (e.g. Mayer & Weber 2009).    
In relation to contracts, research indicates that even though individual contract 
clauses or the entire contract can be framed promotively, most of today’s contracts 
play a prevention role. Moreover, the increasing use of contract automation tools is 
likely to further this bias (Rich et al. forthcoming). It also seems that regulatory focus 
can have an impact throughout the contract’s lifecycle: negotiation, design, review, 
performance, and management (Rich et al. forthcoming: 4). For the purposes of my 
research, studies of contract frames’ influence on contract negotiations, exchange 
relationships, exchange performance, and relational governance are of particular 
relevance. 
First, in relation to contract negotiations, people with a promotion focus seem to 
achieve better outcomes than those with a prevention focus (Galinsky et al. 2005; 
Shalvi et al. 2013; Trötschel et al. 2013; Rich et al. forthcoming). Moreover, research 
suggests that a negotiator’s regulatory focus differs by occupation, and this must be 
taken into account in negotiations. For example, lawyers are presumed to frame 
contracts preventively because of their university education and working life 
expectations.74 Thus, a lawyer might be better at planning and negotiating preventive 
contract clauses but IT managers may be better suited to planning exploratory tasks 
that often require creative and flexible contract terms and would therefore benefit 
from a promotively framed contract (e.g. Mayer &Weber 2009: 14–16). Most 
 
 
74  Although this is only a presumption and probably an oversimplified generalization, it 
sounds plausible. Lawyers are trained to mitigate risks and to prevent their clients from 
assuming excessive liability in contracts. Moreover, according to previous studies, 
experts in occupations that require similar precision to that required by legal 
occupation, such as bookkeepers and accountants, seem to have a preventive regulatory 
focus. See Mayer & Weber 2009: 14, with references. 
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importantly, lawyers and other contracting professionals should be trained to 
recognize the different ways in which a contract can be framed and their own 
regulatory focus, and to understand how the framing influences the exchange 
relationship and performance (Argyres & Mayer 2007; Weber et al. 2011; Rich et al. 
forthcoming). Moreover, firms should align the framing of clauses that are not task-
specific with their organizational regulatory focus. Developing this kind of 
contracting capability is presumed to lead to sustained competitive advantage 
because the process is complex and thus non-imitable (e.g. Weber & Mayer 2009). 
Second, in relation to exchange performance and exchange relationships, 
researchers have argued that different contract framings can induce a situational 
regulatory focus. For instance, Weber & Bauman (2019) argue that “contracts that 
frame goals as obligations and describe safeguards in terms of penalties may induce 
a prevention focus, and contracts that frame goals as opportunities and describe 
safeguards in terms of rewards may induce a promotion focus” (Weber & Bauman 
2019: 363). Consequently, contract frames can be exploited in exchanges requiring 
different behaviors: for example, preventive contracts are better suited to mission-
critical exchanges in which the failure of a task has a significant negative impact on 
the exchange or on the exchange partners, and the performance of a specific 
transaction is more important than continuing the relationship between the 
organizations. However, if a task is considered to be exploratory, i.e. when the 
supplier is developing something new or using an untested technology to create new 
functionality, or the parties seek a collaborative, longer-term relationship, one should 
select a promotive contract, sometimes even when the framing contradicts the task 
type (Mayer & Weber 2009: 12–13; Weber et al. 2011: 196–198; Weber & Mayer 
2011: 58–61). Promotion-framed contracts are also better suited when the supplier 
suspects in advance that it may not be able to meet the performance expectations 
during the exchange (Weber & Mayer 2011: 65). Finally, promotion-framed duration 
clauses75 seem more appropriate than preventively framed duration clauses76 in 
exchanges with great geographical distances, or when the quality of the delivery is 
hard to measure, prior projects have involved the same customer, and the technology 
can be reused in the future (Weber et al. 2011). In essence, research suggests that the 
optimal framing of a contract depends on transactional attributes and the desired type 
of interorganizational relationship. If the contract frame, the transactional attributes 
 
 
75  Promotion-framed duration clauses refer to provisions that allow a party to unilaterally 
renew a contract on the condition that the other party performs well (Weber et al. 2011: 
183). 
76  Preventively framed duration clauses are early termination clauses that allow one party 
to unilaterally terminate the contract before its initial end date if the other party does 




and the desired relationship type are aligned, contracts can positively impact both 
the exchange relationship and exchange performance (Weber & Mayer 2011: 73). 
However, if the clause framing does not match the transactional attributes and the 
desired type of relationship, the contract––be it promotively or preventively framed–
–may be detrimental to the ongoing relationship (Weber et al. 2011: 199). 
Third, research on contract framing contributes to the ongoing discussion on the 
relationship between contracts and relational governance, presented in detail in Sub-
chapter 2.4. Studies have been particularly interested in how contract framing 
influences the development of trust and other relational governance. Initially, Mayer 
& Weber (2009) and Weber & Mayer (2011) proposed that promotively framed 
contract clauses can induce trust and complement relational governance, whereas 
preventively framed contract terms substitute trust and relational governance. In the 
context of franchise contracts, Bertrandias et al. (2010) corroborated these 
suggestions and found that, first, promotion-oriented contracts induced a higher level 
of goodwill trust77 in the franchisor than prevention contracts. Moreover, it seemed 
that in promotion-framed contracts, perceived completeness positively influenced 
trust while such influence was not found in prevention-framed contracts. Finally, 
they found that perceived franchisor control negatively affected trust in prevention 
contracts but had no influence in promotion contracts. More recently, Weber (2017) 
has theorized that different types of trust develop in repeated exchanges through 
learning, which is influenced by contract frame and other cognitive elements (such 
as intergroup attributional bias78 and partner explanations of trust violations). This, 
in turn, has an influence on whether contracts act as complements or substitutes to 
specific types of trust (Weber 2017: 756). A recent study by Weber & Bauman 
(2019) empirically verified that promotively framed contracts induced more trust 
than preventively framed contracts, but also found that both contracts increased the 
level of trust in comparison to a no-contract situation, again providing proof of the 
complementary view.  
Although the dichotomous division between promotion and prevention frames 
might be too simplistic in the context of contract framing––and more studies are 
 
 
77  Organizational and management scholars have defined trust as “the willingness of a 
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the 
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 1995: 712). The concept of trust 
has been further divided into competence trust, which refers to the partner’s ability to 
perform according to agreement, and goodwill trust, that is, the partner’s intention to 
perform according to the agreement (e.g. Nooteboom 1996: 990). 
78  Intergroup attributional bias refers to group members’ tendencies to make external 
attributions for their partner’s positive behavior and internal attributions for their 
partner’s negative behavior. This bias is very common in interorganizational exchanges 
(Weber 2017: 748). 
From neoclassical economics and classical contract law to the functional use of contracts 
 49 
needed to explore, first, the interaction between different framings in a single 
contract, and second, their mutual effects on exchange relationships––the research 
on contract framing underlines important and previously understudied issues in 
contract design. In sum, this research suggests that a negotiator’s or organization’s 
chronic regulatory focus influences the way in which contract negotiations proceed 
and contracts are designed. Thus, negotiators, as well as organizations, should be 
aware of their own regulatory focus and exploit this focus in negotiations and 
contract design processes. At times, they might need to adopt a contextually induced 
regulatory focus that best fits the exchange at hand and which might differ from their 
own regulatory focus. In addition, prevention and promotion frames should be used 
intentionally to match the requirements and expectations of the exchange 
relationship and exchange performance. The influences of contract frames on trust 
and other relational governance mechanisms should already be taken into 
consideration in the early phases of contracting to enable contracting professionals 
to use contract framing strategically ( Weber & Bauman 2019: 379; Rich et al. 
forthcoming: 2). In fact, Rich et al. (forthcoming: 15–16) encourage organizations 
to develop a new job function of “relationship manager”; someone to actively 
manage negotiator and contract frames and to match them with exchange 
characteristics and the desired relationship type. 
2.9 Section summary and my entry point 
Contracting research has undergone many transformations over the last two 
centuries. The neoclassical economic model characterized by the artificial Leviathan 
idea of humans as rational decision-makers, homo economicus, and the system of 
classical contract law that was based on the idea of a discrete market exchange with 
no social ties between the exchange parties, was first complemented by the 
neoclassical contract law of legal realists and finally by the relational contract theory. 
In economics, the ideas of the relationalists were followed by the ideas of transaction 
cost economist Oliver E. Williamson, who was interested in the comparative study 
of different governance modes of exchange relations. Like relational contract theory, 
TCE is interested in the social contexts of transactions and offers normative guidance 
on how to choose an optimal governance model for a specific transaction. The basic 
argument of TCE is that because organizations (as well as the people within the 
organizations) are only boundedly rational, homo psychologicus, and often act out 
of self-interest or opportunism, and because specific transactional attributes form 
exchange hazards that enable opportunism, exchanges need to be governed by 
different governance modes, ranging from markets to the firm. 
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Although TCE is arguably one of the most influential economic theories of our 
time79 and has been widely tested and applied in economics as well as in other 
disciplines, it does not account for all choices related to the governance of 
transactions. In this chapter, I have discussed research streams which, while building 
on relational contract theory and TCE, also further develop them and even criticize 
some parts of TCE.  
To begin with, the relational view focuses on the interplay between relational 
governance, such as trust, and formal governance, such as contracts, and argues that 
formal governance is not sufficient for governing interorganizational relationships.  
Some have even claimed that it would be more beneficial for organizations to use 
only relational governance to guide exchanges. Most proponents of the relational 
view, however, call for the combined use of both governance mechanisms, because 
rather than substituting each other, formal and relational governance actually 
complement one another.  
The functional approach to contracting also emphasizes other coexisting 
functionalities of contracts, such as coordination and adaptation, along with the 
safeguarding function, and is interested in the relationship between contractual 
functions and relational governance, and their mutual effects on the exchange 
relationship. In essence, these studies suggest that clauses that serve different 
functions have distinct effects on relational governance and the exchange 
relationship. For instance, coordinative contract clauses can support the development 
of trust whereas the excessive use of safeguarding clauses can erode trust.  
Moreover, the proactive contracting approach underlines the positive, proactive 
dimensions of contracts by conceptualizing them as tools to promote business 
success, to foster collaboration, and to prevent problems. Recently, proponents of 
the proactive approach have applied design-based methods to study contracts and 
contracting, and have been particularly interested in questions such as how to design 
contracts that can be used for an organization’s competitive advantage and how 
contract design choices affect exchange parties’ attitudes, behavior and the exchange 
relationship.  
Finally, recent studies have been particularly interested in different contract 
frames, their relation to personal and organizational regulatory focus, and their 
influence on shaping exchange partners’ interpretations, behavior and 
interorganizational relationship. These studies suggest that the contractual frame 
must be selected on the basis of, for example, transaction attributes, task 
characteristics and the type of relationship desired. 
 
 
79  Oliver E. Williamson was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for 
his work related to TCE. See Nobel Media AB 2021. 
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In sum, although the focus of both organizational and management studies, as 
well as contract law scholarship, has shifted from calculative neoclassical economics 
and formal, classical contract law toward relationally oriented theories that recognize 
humans’ limited abilities and their desire for collaboration, and regard contracts as 
tools for supporting relational governance and collaboration, the different theoretical 
approaches have developed in their own foxholes. My aim is to find the common 
denominators of these theories in order to analyze how organizations use contracts 
in their interorganizational exchange relations.  Figure 3 below depicts my 
understanding of the transactional attributes and contract design choices that 
characterize interorganizational exchange relations.  
 
Figure 3. Characteristics and contract design choices of interorganizational exchange relations. 
The figure draws on relational contract theory (the as-if-discrete––relational 
spectrum), TCE (the transactional attributes listed under the as-if-discrete and 
relational transactions), the proactive contracting approach, contract design research, 
the relational view, the functional approach to contracting, and RFT. It illustrates the 
different aspects that need to be taken into account when studying interorganizational 
exchange relations and their contract design choices. In my view, all 
interorganizational exchange relations are situated on the as-if-discrete––relational 
spectrum and are characterized by different transactional attributes. These are the 
macro-level theories that influence the contract design choices of interorganizational 
exchange relations. Depending on the transactional attributes on the one hand and 
on the location of the exchange in the transactional-relational spectrum on the other, 
user-friendly contract design choices should be guided by the proactive contracting 
approach. In transactions that fall closer to the as-if-discrete end of the spectrum, 
organizations may rely more on formal governance, use contracts as safeguards, and 
frame contracts preventively. In cases of relational exchanges, in turn, organizations 
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may use both formal and informal governance, utilize the various functions of 
contracts, and frame contracts promotively. This theoretical positioning guided my 
research process throughout the individual sub-studies reported in the Publications. 
Next, I move on to describe my methodological standpoint. 
 53 
3 Research design 
3.1 Research methodology: American New Legal 
Realism 
Methodologically, this study embraces American New Legal Realism (ANLR), 
which emerged in the US at the turn of the 1990s and is rooted in “traditional” or 
“old” American Legal Realism (ALR)80 (e.g. Alexander 2002; Erlanger et al. 2005; 
Nourse & Shaffer 2009; Suchman & Mertz 2010; Malminen 2016; Talesh et al. 
2021; Poppe 2021). Consequently, following the work of, for example, Stewart 




80  The golden days of ALR were in the late 1920s and 1930s in the Columbia Law School 
and Yale Law School (e.g. Alexander 2002; Malminen 2016). ALR can be seen as a 
continuation of early twentieth century progressivism (e.g. Alexander 2002; Nourse & 
Shaffer 2009; Poppe forthcoming; Talesh et al. 2021). For more on the rise and fall of 
ALR, see e.g. Schlegel 1979. For the history of ANLR, see e.g. Erlanger et al. 2005; 
Macaulay 2005; Nourse & Shaffer 2009. For a comparison between ALR and ANLR, 
see e.g. Macaulay 2005; Nourse & Shaffer 2009. 
Europeans have also had their own realist movement, the Scandinavian legal realist 
movement, followed by the European New Legal Realist movement (ENLR). For a 
comparison of ALR and Scandinavian legal realism, see e.g. Alexander 2002. For the 
ENLR, especially in the context of international law, and the differences between 
ANLR and ENLR, see e.g. Holtermann & Madsen 2015; Holtermann & Madsen 2021. 
Scandinavian legal realism can be seen as a version of legal positivism and both 
European realistic movements are more concerned with philosophical and 
epistemological issues in legal science than their American counterparts. I identify 
myself with ANLR because of my empirical, pragmatic and limitedly positivistic 
research stance. For a critical perspective of both new realist movements, see Augsberg 
2015. 
81  For more on the work of Macaulay, see Sub-chapter 2.3.1. 
82  For a recent volume on New Legal Realism, see Talesh et al. (eds) 2021. See also Mertz 
et al. (eds) 2016; Klug & Merry (eds) 2016. 
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I am primarily interested in the living law83 or the “private governments” 
(Macaulay 2006: 1169) of contracting parties––in other words, the contracts and 
other governance mechanisms that actually direct the behavior of the parties in 
interorganizational exchange relations. However, despite my interest in the law-in-
action approach84, my purpose is not to deny the potential of doctrinal studies of 
contract law; it is to examine them critically (Erlanger et al. 2005: 345). The 
following reference from Macaulay (2016) reflects my stance on the potential and 
power of law and doctrinal studies: 
“Sometimes rules of law do work in a large percentage of situations. Sometimes 
they do not. New legal realism recognizes this and demands that we put doctrine 
in its place.” (Macaulay 2016: 153) 
Consequently, I chose to study the contracting practices of interorganizational 
exchange relationships empirically, using a bottom-up approach85 embraced by 
ANLR. Moreover, I chose my research designs and methods pragmatically86, based 
on the problems that needed solving and the questions in which I was interested. 
Finally, following ANLR’s pluralistic view, my research is interdisciplinary and uses 
 
 
83  Indeed, American New Legal Realists understand law as the living law referred to by 
Eugen Ehrlich as follows: “…law which is not imprisoned in rules of law, but which 
dominates life itself. The sources of its knowledge are above all the modern documents, 
and also immediate study of life itself, of commerce, of customs and usage, and of all 
sorts of organizations, including those which are recognized by the law, and, indeed, 
those which are disapproved by the law.” (Page 1977: 39, quoting Ehrlich's description 
of the living law). Hence, the focus of ANLR is “on more relational, contingent, 
context-sensitive, or process-based understandings of law, where law is both dependent 
variable and independent variable” (McCann 2016: xv). Moreover, the law itself is 
recognized as power––“as language/discourse, as institutional practices, as aspirational 
ideals, as actual or potential enforcement by state violence, and so on…” (McCann 
2016: xv). See also Talesh et al. 2021: 9. 
84  The living law approach and the law-in-action approach are sometimes said to mean 
different things. For a discussion of the living law approach and the law-in-action 
approach in the context of ANLR, see Macaulay 2005. 
85  Bottom-up approach means that the impacts of law and legal phenomena are studied 
empirically from the grass-root level. This approach provides voice for people affected 
by legal phenomena (e.g. Erlanger et al. 2005: 339–341). See also Nourse & Shaffer 
2009; Suchman & Mertz 2010. 
86  According to pragmatism, the best way to resolve a problem is to act (Erlanger et al. 
2005: 356–357). For more about ANLR and pragmatism, see Erlanger et al. 2005; 
Nourse & Shaffer 2009; Suchman & Mertz 2010. For more about pragmatism in the 
context of contract design research, see Passera 2017: 100–101. 
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versatile methods to study contracts and contracting in “the real world” (e.g. Talesh 
et al. 2021: 14).87 
Further, although I acknowledge that my own ideological views and beliefs have 
influenced the research themes I have decided to study, I have committed myself to 
limited positivism, according to which humans can, to some degree, see and 
understand in a positivist sense the physical world outside their own psyches, 
including human behavior and institutions (Macneil 1983: 408). In fact, unlike the 
proponents of some stricter forms of constructionism, I believe that it is possible to 
gain knowledge that is to some extent free of the researcher’s own preferences and 
ideologies (Macneil 1983: 408). However, I also admit that situated knowledge 
underlines the role of the social scientist as a human and political being in shaping 
research outcomes, irrespective of the methods used in the study (e.g. Erlanger et al. 
2005: 342–343). 
Acknowledging these limitations that I face as a researcher and in order to secure 
the scientific rigor of my research, I critically reflected on my own motives and 
prejudices throughout the research process (e.g. Erlanger et al. 2005: 342–343). 
Consequently, having examined the contracting practices of a very limited number 
of organizations, mostly from the perspectives of relational, proactive and functional 
contracting, and by acquiring data from organizations through qualitative methods, 
I realize that I can provide only a tentative illustration of current contracting practices 
in certain fields of businesses. Reiterating Macaulay (2005: 396), I can only offer a 
provisional and qualified picture of the contracting realities of the companies I 
studied. Therefore, I hope that my findings will be tested, challenged and 
complemented. Ultimately, my aim is to answer to the call for more robust, 
theoretical, empirical, and multidisciplinary contract research (e.g Berger-Walliser 
2012: 31; Haapio 2013: 88; Passera 2017: 172–174; Nystén-Haarala 2017: 1033; 
Nuottila 2019: 37–38). 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
3.2.1 Collaborative and explorative action research 
(Publications I and II) 
Publications I and II were co-authored by Magnus Gustafsson, Maria Ivanova-
Gongne, Johanna Liinamaa, Hanna Luotola, and Mika Viljanen.88 The aim of the 
 
 
87  ANLR scholars believe that it is the research questions that direct the choice of methods 
and thus, qualitative, quantitative and experimental methods are valued. See e.g. 
Suchman & Mertz 2010: 562. 
88  For my contributions to Publications I and II, see Annex 1. 
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research project reported in Publications I and II was, first, to explore the possible 
solutions to the challenges our case company faced when developing a new business 
model using value-based selling techniques89 and performance-based contracts90 
(reported in Publication I); and second, to examine how the functional contracting 
approach could facilitate the creation and governance of a business network that was 
a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the new business model (reported 
in Publication II). 
The research problem directed us to use explorative action research as our 
method of study and analysis (e.g. Lewin 1946; Susman & Evered 1978). Action 
research is rooted in American pragmatism and has been developed by social 
psychologist Kurt Lewin. He initiated the “Harwood studies”, which focused on the 
problem of employee turnover in the Harwood Manufacturing Corporation (e.g. 
Lewin 1946, 1948; Burnes 2007). 
Lewin (1946) characterized action research as “comparative research on the 
conditions and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading to 
social action” (Lewin 1946: 35). In other words, action research has dual objective: 
first, it aims to produce scientific knowledge on social action. Second, it aims to 
solve practical problems by social action (e.g. Clark 1980; 152; Heikkinen 2001: 
170–171). 
The research was conducted in a large team that consisted of researchers from 
fields such as law, industrial management, design, and marketing. Company 
representatives ranged from managers to sales personnel and from technical 
engineers to in-house counsels. In addition, consultants specialized in industrial 
investments and project business were part of the team. The research project started 
at the end of 2013 and lasted until June 2015. During the project, we held tens of 
meetings that dealt with the project in general and with the productization of the 
company’s new business model. In addition, we organized trainings and followed up 
the sales cases. Figure 4 presents the most important events, meetings and data of 
the research project. 
 
 
89  For the definition of value-based selling, see Note 15. 




Figure 4. Most important events, meetings and data of research project. Adapted from Publication 
I. Used with permission. 
The research project proceeded as a cyclical process, as we followed the five phases 
of action research described by Susman & Evered (1978): diagnosing, action 
planning, action taking, evaluating, and specifying learning (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Cyclical action research process. 
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Data analysis was conducted throughout the research process. More specifically, in 
the diagnosis phase, the researchers held meetings and in-depth discussions with key 
representatives of the company and reviewed the relevant background 
documentation. In the action planning phase, the researchers reviewed the relevant 
literature on value-based sales, contracts and contracting, and interorganizational 
integration. The relevant literature was then presented and reviewed with company 
representatives to determine different possibilities for action. From this, the company 
chose to develop a value-based sales process and a functional contracting process to 
implement its new business model. We co-designed the sales and contracting 
processes together with the company representatives, participated in negotiations 
with selected customers, and provided sales training to the sales personnel of the 
company. In the last two phases of the process (evaluating and specifying learning), 
we analyzed the memos and feedback from business cases, reviewed the evolving 
sales training workshops, and revised the sales and the contracting processes with 
the organization’s sales manager, solution designer, and legal department. The entire 
research team also discussed the commonalities of individual case findings. Finally, 
to disseminate and elaborate on the scientific findings of the research project, six 
researchers, including myself, wrote Publications I and II. 
3.2.2 Expert interview study (Publication III) 
Publication III, co-authored with Sampo Viding, focuses on the relationships among 
relational governance, contract functions, and interorganizational relationship 
performance.91 In order to understand these phenomena, we designed a theory-
generating expert interview study that comprised 23 interviews of 24 contract 
experts. We defined “contract expert” as a person who regularly works with 
contracts, for instance with contract drafting, contract negotiations, and contract 
execution. Thus, educational background or formal training was not of importance 
to us. Rather, we were interested in the knowledge that the interviewees had acquired 
through their concrete work with contracts (Korkea-aho & Leino 2019: 31).  
We chose to conduct theory-generating expert interviews mainly for two reasons. 
First, we wanted to interview contract experts because we were interested in their 
interpretative knowledge of their organizations’ contracting practices. Interpretative 
knowledge refers to the expert’s subjective orientations, rules, viewpoints, and 
interpretations that influence the actions of other actors in the expert’s field. In other 
words, the contract expert’s interpretative knowledge affects the ways in which other 
contract experts and organizations use contracts (Bogner & Menz 2009: 53–55) and 
 
 
91  For my contribution to Publication III, see Annex 1. 
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thus, contract experts are also permitted to speak as representatives of their 
respective organizations (Littig 2011: 1344). 
Second, our aim was to theorize on contract experts’ views on contracts and their 
relationship among relational governance and interorganizational relationship 
performance (Bogner & Menz 2009: 48). The theory-generating interview method 
seemed to fit our research objectives because it “seeks to formulate a theoretically 
rich conceptualization of (implicit) stores of knowledge, conceptions of the world 
and routines, which the experts develop in their activities and which are constitutive 
for the functioning of social systems” (Bogner & Menz 2009: 48). 
We selected the interviewees based on a survey study that we conducted in 
autumn 2016 with 65 contract experts working in companies that at some point had 
participated in DIMECC’s (formerly FIMECC) research programs.92 At the end of 
the survey, all the participants were asked to indicate whether they would be willing 
to participate in the interview study. We phoned those who had indicated their 
willingness and explained the purpose of the study and agreed on a date for a face-
to-face interview. Before the interview, we emailed the interviewees the interview 
themes93 and a unilateral confidentiality agreement94. Some of the participants 
wanted to amend the confidentiality agreement before the interview and we agreed 
to these amendments. Nine lawyers, two contract managers (one of whom was also 
a lawyer), five procurement professionals, four sales professionals, two chief 
executive officers (CEOs), and three other types of professionals who regularly dealt 
with contracts participated in the study.  
The semi-structured interviews were conducted during autumn 2016 by myself 
and my colleague Sampo Viding. I was the sole interviewer in 12 interviews and my 
colleague in one interview. The rest of the interviews we conducted together. All the 
interviews except for one were individual interviews. One interview was a group 
interview with two interviewees. At the start of the interview, we introduced 
ourselves and the research project, went through the confidentiality agreement and 
explained the privacy and anonymity practices to the interviewee(s). All the 
interviews lasted approximately one hour, were conducted in Finnish, and were tape-
recorded. After the interviews, the recordings were transcribed verbatim and the 
transcriptions were coded in NVivo 11. 
 
 
92  FIMECC was a strategic center for research in the Finnish metals and engineering 
industries. In 2016, FIMECC merged with DIGILE, and the company changed its name 
to DIMECC. By 2016, 137 companies had participated in FIMECC’s research 
programs. 
93  On file with author in Finnish. 
94  On file with author in Finnish. 
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The coding and the analysis process followed the six phases of thematic analysis 
of Braun & Clarke (2006: 86–93). Table 2 presents the phases of the coding and 
analysis process and the way in which we applied them in our study. 
Table 2. Phases of thematic analysis applied in Publication III. 
Phase Actions taken in each phase of the study 
1. Familiarizing 
yourself with your 
data 
We read through the transcriptions, listened to the recordings, and 
corrected the transcriptions when necessary. 
2. Generating initial 
codes 
We designed the first coding scheme based on the interview themes that 
were theory driven. Thereafter, we wrote summaries of the interviews to 
ensure that the coding scheme reflected the contents of the interviews. 
3. Searching for 
themes 
We examined the data extracts from the codes that were relevant to our 




We compared the themes with our data extracts and recoded the data, this 
time selectively, based on the themes and sub-themes identified in the 
previous phase. We also generated a thematic map that organized the 
themes hierarchically. 
 
5. Defining and 
naming themes 
We revised the themes, their names and their definitions. 
6. Producing the 
report 
We wrote Publication III. 
 
3.2.3 Contract document analysis (Publication IV) 
Publication IV describes the functions by which companies use contracts and the 
ways in which contracts are framed. In the study, I analyzed ten purchase contract 
documents of companies that participated in the interview study discussed in the 
previous sub-chapter. 
I obtained the purchase contract documents by asking the interviewees to send 
me examples of their company’s contract documents. Representatives of eight 
companies sent me a total of nine contract templates, one actual signed agreement, 
and eight standard terms and conditions (T&Cs). The contract templates ranged from 
research and development (R&D) contracts and cooperation agreements to service 
supply agreements and purchase agreements. For Publication IV, I chose to analyze 
the purchase contract templates and standard T&Cs. Ultimately, the analyzed 
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documents covered six purchase contract templates and four standard T&Cs. Two of 
the contracts were in Finnish and eight were in English.95 
I began the analysis process by reading through the documents in order to 
develop an overview of the contracts. I then reread the contracts and concentrated on 
the specific clauses, their functions, and their relations to other clauses. My analysis 
was informed by concept-driven qualitative content analysis, in which the coding 
categories or themes are derived from previous knowledge, such as a theory, as was 
the case in my study (Schreier 2012: 84–87; Schreier 2014: 178).  
Initially, the functional categories used in the analysis process were derived from 
the functional contracting approach and were the same as those identified in 
Publication III: safeguarding, codification, coordination, adaptation, internal 
management, and collaboration. However, as is usual in content analysis (Schreier 
2012: 87; Schreier 2014: 178), the concept-driven categories were complemented by 
a new, data-driven category, which will be presented and discussed in greater detail 
in Sub-chapters 4.3 and 5.1. After the first coding, I recessed the analysis process for 
two months. Then, I recoded the contracts blindly. I also revised the new, data-driven 
category based on the feedback given by the anonymous reviewers, and adjusted the 
coding accordingly. 
Finally, I analyzed the contracts in terms of their framing. Again, this analysis 
was concept driven as rested on two contract frames introduced by RFT: preventive 
and promotive.96 However, I complemented these categories by data-driven 
categories and ultimately, I classified the framings as either preventive, promotive, 
collaborative, one-sided, or contradictory. 
3.3 Ethical reflections and data management 
In Finland, researchers in all disciplines are guided by general ethical principles, 
such as respect for the dignity and autonomy of human research participants, respect 
for material and immaterial cultural heritage and biodiversity, and commitment to 
conduct research in a way that does not cause significant risks, damage or harm to 
research participants, communities or other subjects of the research (TENK 3/2019: 
8). Moreover, all scientific research in Finland must comply with the guidelines for 
the responsible conduct of research (TENK 2012) drawn up by the Finnish National 
Board on Research Integrity, TENK. Finally, all research on humans and human 
 
 
95  The analysis process only covered the express, visible terms of the contract documents 
and ignored the implied or invisible terms which are also part of the contract. For more 
about express and invisible terms and their relation to contract literacy, see e.g. 
DiMatteo et al. 2012: 72–73; Haapio 2013: 43–45; Annola et al. forthcoming: 2–3. 
96  For more about RFT in the context of contract framing research, see Sub-chapter 2.8. 
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behavior must follow the ethical principles of research with human participants 
(TENK 3/2019). The ethical principles require, for example, that participation in 
research is voluntary and that the participants give informed consent for their 
participation. Moreover, participants should receive understandable and truthful 
information about the research and the potential benefits, harms and risks related to 
it (TENK 3/2019: 10). In addition, the ethical principles guide the processing of 
personal data in research, the protection of privacy in research publications, and the 
openness of research data (TENK 3/2019: 12–16). Next, I describe the means that I, 
in collaboration with my research colleagues, used in the sub-studies to adhere to the 
guidelines and principles mentioned above. 
In regard to the informed consent and the voluntary nature of research, the case 
company of Publications I and II participated in the DIMECC REBUS research 
program97 voluntarily and signed a consortium agreement. In addition, the project 
team of the company was formed of voluntary employees. The team was fully aware 
of the research project, as it participated in the planning of the project in 
collaboration with the researchers. 
As explained in Sub-chapter 3.2.2 in relation to Publication III, the interviewees 
volunteered to participate in the study by expressing their willingness to be 
interviewed at the end of the survey study. Before the interviews, we contacted the 
interviewees by phone and explained the purpose of our study and highlighted that 
participation would be fully voluntary and that the findings would be reported in a 
manner that individual respondents or the companies they represented could not be 
identified. Furthermore, the interviewees were given a unilateral confidentiality 
agreement before the interviews. Therefore, the participants gave their informed 
consent to participate in the study even though we did not ask them to sign a written 
informed consent form.  
Regarding the rights of the participants to receive information on the content of 
the research, the processing of personal data and how the research is to be conducted 
in practice, in the case of Publications I and II, they received this information at the 
beginning of and during the research project, and in the case of Publications III and 
IV, during the phone call and again at the start of their interviews. 
Furthermore, I aimed to respect the principles of avoiding harm in research and 
the principles related to the processing of personal data by first managing the data 
carefully. In regard to Publications I and II, all data were stored in the secured cloud 
service of Åbo Akademi (OwnCloud) and could not be accessed by any unauthorized 
persons. Regarding Publications III and IV, the interview recordings, transcripts, 
contract documents, and all analysis data were stored in the secured cloud service of 
 
 
97  For more about the DIMECC REBUS research program, see Note 11. 
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the University of Turku (Seafile) and could not be accessed by any unauthorized 
persons. Moreover, in relation to Publications I and II, we only gathered and 
processed personal data to contact the participants and report on our findings. In the 
case of Publications III and IV, the interviewees, as well as the companies that they 
represented and the companies that provided us with the contract documents, were 
kept anonymous. I deleted all personal or confidential data as soon as it was 
reasonable in terms of the research. The transcribed interviews as well as the contract 
documents are still stored in the secured cloud service of the University of Turku 
(Seafile) where no unauthorized persons can access them. This is in case I am asked 
to verify the interviews or the contract documents. The transcribed interview data do 
not include any direct identifiers or personal information about the interviewees. 
Second, I tried to analyze the data and report the findings in a way that respects 
the views of the research participants.  In the case of Publications I and II, we also 
offered the participants the opportunity to comment on the draft articles before they 
were published. Moreover, in accordance with the DIMECC REBUS consortium 
agreement, we provided all consortium parties with the opportunity to object to the 
publication of Publications I and II. In the cases of Publications III and IV, my 
colleague Viding and I promised to send a report of the preliminary findings to the 
participants for comments before it was published. However, because of time 
constraints, we did not write a written report on the preliminary findings. Instead, we 
organized a seminar during which we discussed the findings orally. We invited all 
the participants to the seminar. Afterwards, we wrote Publication III, and I wrote 
Publication IV. In retrospect, in the case of Publication III, we could have offered 
the participants the opportunity to comment on the article before it was published. I 
did send the published article to each participant, along with a draft version of 
Publication IV. 
To protect the privacy of the research participants (both the companies and their 
employees) in the Publications, we used a pseudonym for the case company in 
Publications I and II. In Publications III and IV, the extracts from the interviews, as 
well as the contract extracts, were modified when necessary, and the names of the 
interviewees and companies and the dates and places of the interviews were omitted. 
 Finally, in accordance with the DIMECC REBUS consortium agreement, no 
data used in this research are publicly available. 
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4 Summary of results 
This chapter presents a summary of the findings reported in Publications I–IV. 
Throughout the chapter, I focus on the findings that directly relate to the main 
research question posed in this summary.  
The results indicate that companies use contracts to serve various functions such 
as safeguarding, codification, adaptation, coordination, internal management, policy, 
and collaboration. They also show that these functions, as well as the framing of the 
contract clauses, have distinct effects on relational governance, satisfaction with the 
exchange relationship, and overall relationship performance. When contracts are 
designed and used intelligently, i.e. in the proactive, functional frame, they can 
facilitate precontractual integration, complement relational governance, and support 
the creation and governance of collaborative interorganizational exchange relations. 
Yet the findings suggest that today, organizations favor preventively framed 
contracts and focus mainly on safeguarding their own interests, sometimes at the 
expense of their contracting partners. This is alarming, because research shows that 
excessive use of safeguarding clauses and one-sided contracts can be destructive to 
the interorganizational relationship and the exchange as a whole. 
4.1 Functional contracting for network creation and 
governance (Publications I and II) 
Publication I explored the challenges faced in the implementation of a new business 
model that incorporated performance-based contracts and value-based selling 
techniques. Furthermore, it studied how the functional contracting process could 
facilitate the precontractual integration of the seller and buyer organizations that 
was required in order to overcome these challenges. In this context, integration 
referred to the coordination and adaptation of organizations’ activities on several 
levels and with multiple tools, “bringing or joining together a number of distinct 
things so that they move, operate and function as a harmonious, optimal unit” 
(Kirsilä et al. 2007: 715). Publication II, in turn, examined the same phenomena on 
the level of business networks, i.e. how the functional contracting process could 
facilitate network creation and governance. Because the findings presented in both 
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Publications differ only slightly in regard to their context and focus, I will present 
them together. 
To begin with, we discovered that a number of challenges must be overcome for 
the transition to a business model that includes performance-based contracts to be 
successful. Most of these challenges had already been identified in previous research 
(e.g. Töytäri & Rajala 2015; Töytäri et al. 2015). For example, like Töytäri et al. 
(2015), we found that network participants were resistant to the new pricing model 
included in the performance-based contract. This is because it disrupts the dominant, 
cost-plus pricing approach, which is based on discrete value-creation processes and 
requires deep collaboration between network members. Studies suggest that this kind 
of resistance can only be overcome in certain circumstances and by concerted, well-
designed marketing efforts that are implemented consistently (e.g. Töytäri et al. 
2015). 
In particular, we identified legal-technical contract design issues as an important 
but previously unknown challenge to this kind of business model transition. Firstly, 
the performance-based contracts that were used to formalize the solution offering of 
our case company were complex and expensive to design. In fact, we discovered that 
the transaction costs of these contracts may actually prohibit the use of the new 
pricing model. In our case, for example, the key performance indicators (KPIs) that 
would be needed to calculate the increase in the financial performance of the 
customer proved to be complex to map and difficult to formalize into well-
functioning contract clauses. Secondly, the introduction of this new, untested 
contract model triggered disinclination in legal departments, probably because they 
posed new kinds of risks, which most lawyers are trying to avoid or mitigate (e.g. 
Haapio 2013: 1). Moreover, performance-based contracts contradict the classical 
contract law structures adopted by most lawyers, which stress unambiguity, 
completeness, and certainty, and regard contracts as static allocations of rights and 
obligations (e.g. Macneil 1978: 862–865). 
Furthermore, we found that because of the legal-technical challenges related to 
the new business model, the company had to convince the customer to accept the 
new pricing model along with its contract structure. Because the company had no 
established tools for this, the project team designed new sales and contracting 
processes to facilitate the precontractual integration and overcome the identified 
challenges. In particular, we deployed the idea that contracts can be used in the 
functional frame to allow network participants to align their sales and purchasing 
processes and to synchronize their value perceptions. This process would also help 
our case company present the benefits of the new value-sharing arrangement to the 
network participants. The end result was a value-based selling process and a 




Figure 6. Value-based sales process and functional contracting process designed for case 
company. Adapted from Publication I. Used with permission. 
The functional contracting process deploys safeguarding, adaptive, coordinative, and 
collaborative memoranda of understanding (MoUs), which break down the sales and 
negotiation processes into phases and allow the compartmentalization of the specific 
challenges the company expected to encounter during each phase. For example, 
MoU 1 sought to establish the new sales process within the case company and 
influence parties’ behavior during negotiations, creating an honest negotiation space. 
MoUs 2 and 3, in turn, attempted to force a new customer interface by requiring the 
customer to commit to having their board approve the new pricing model. 
Furthermore, the MoUs aimed to eliminate opportunistic behavior by leveraging the 
contractual sanction mechanisms for unauthorized use of the case company’s 
designs. In essence, the functional contracting process was designed to complement 
our case company’s relational integration efforts and to increase trust between 
network participants. Moreover, it was targeted not only toward the customer’s 
frontline employees, but also its executive-level decision-makers. 
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Based on the findings, we argue that the functional contracting process may be 
a key precontractual integration mechanism to overcome the challenges related to 
the introduction of a new business model that includes performance-based contracts. 
In essence, adopting a functional contracting process along with a value-based sales 
process changes negotiation tactics. They change from a win–lose game, in which 
the negotiating parties are viewed as adversaries and the contract is seen as a mere 
safeguarding tool, to a win–win situation, in which the parties strive for a mutually 
beneficial solution and the contract is a tool for coordination, adaptation and 
collaboration.  
Finally, our findings indicate that the adoption of the functional contracting 
process requires not only interorganizational but also intraorganizational and cross 
professional collaboration. For example, legal, sales, procurement, execution, 
business, and product development professionals should be involved in the 
contracting process. More specifically, lawyers should proactively engage in the 
business and product development processes, taking on a forward-looking role in 
developing flexible and creative legal governance structures for emerging business 
models. In relation to this, business functions have to recognize that lawyers may 
substantively contribute to business development. 
4.2 The various functions of contracts and their 
effects on relational governance and 
interorganizational relationship performance 
(Publication III) 
Utilizing the interview data of 24 contract experts, Publication III focused on the 
relationships among relational governance, contracts and interorganizational 
relationship performance. More specifically, it aimed to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the functions by which companies use contracts to govern 
interorganizational relationships? 
2. How does a contract and its different functions affect relational 
governance (or vice versa) and interorganizational relationship 
performance? 
The functional contracting approach formed the theoretical basis of the study, as in 
Publications I and II. Thus, as my colleague and I analyzed the interview data, we 
expected to find that contracts were used in accordance with the functional 
approach––to safeguard parties’ interests, to adapt the relationship to possible future 
changes, and to coordinate the information flows and roles and responsibilities of the 
parties. However, we discovered that in addition to these three established functions, 
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contracts were used to codify the deal, to manage the internal workflows of the 
organization, and to steer and support interorganizational collaboration beyond the 
ongoing exchange. 
As expected, one of the most used contract functions was safeguarding, in which 
the focus is on protecting the contracting parties against any opportunistic behavior 
of the other party. The clauses used for safeguarding included liabilities, warranties, 
clauses on intellectual property rights (IPRs) and non-disclosure, clauses on supplier 
requirements and supervision, and clauses on conflict management and dispute 
resolution. 
As for interorganizational relationship performance, the interviewees believed 
that in certain situations, safeguarding clauses could support this. For example, a 
non-disclosure agreement (NDA) could create and facilitate trust in the early phases 
of the transaction. However, the interviewees were of the opinion that clauses that 
safeguarded the parties but were one-sided hindered interorganizational relationship 
performance. These specific terms were intended to overprotect the seller and 
transfer excessive risk to the supplier. According to the interviewees, this attitude 
was often already evident during contract negotiations, as contract drafters focused 
on safeguarding their own interests at the expense of their suppliers. 
In addition, the interviewees felt that lawyers sometimes hindered the creation 
of relational norms and collaboration. This was because the lawyers focused too 
much on safeguarding clauses and on irrelevant details without understanding “the 
big picture”. In fact, contracts drafted by lawyers were regarded as excessively long, 
filled with unnecessary legalese, and generally written in complicated English. At 
worst, neither of the negotiating parties understood what they were agreeing to, and 
the drafting process was regarded as a waste of time. However, the lawyers 
themselves regarded their role as essential to assure that the required terms were 
included and written precisely. Legal terms in particular, such as IPR clauses, were 
considered to require legal expertise. 
Further, even though the interviewees mentioned adaptive contract terms such 
as price adjustment clauses, clauses on buffer stock, clauses on change management, 
and clauses on contract termination, it seemed that often the formal, adaptive 
contract terms were complemented by relational governance. This was especially the 
case when contracts did not address a specific contingency or when things did not 
go as planned (e.g. Poppo & Zenger 2002: 713; Schepker et al. 2014: 201; Hadfield 
& Bozovic 2016: 993). For example, when the price of raw materials increased and 
the contract did not contain a price fluctuation clause, the parties were still prepared 
to change pricing terms. Moreover, the companies were willing to agree to minor 
scope changes without a formal amendment to the contract. Last, when changes 
occurred or things went wrong, the parties were flexible and did not follow the 
contract to the letter. Instead, they tried to settle issues amicably and avoid litigation 
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because they valued the relationship over the dispute (e.g. Macaulay 1963: 61; 
WorldCC 2014; Hadfield & Bozovic 2016: 998; Frydlinger et al. 2016: 15). 
Another observation was that contracts were used to coordinate the parties’ 
relationships, tasks, and communication for the duration of the contract. These types 
of clauses were especially used in project business, consortia, R&D agreements, and 
in businesses with a high degree of uncertainty (e.g. Chen et al. 2018). Clauses on 
project organization, steering group protocols, meeting protocols, schedule 
management, cost management, and change management were mentioned as being 
of special importance for project deliveries. Regarding the relationship between 
coordinative clauses and relational governance, the interviewees described how 
coordinative clauses were sometimes complemented by relational governance. For 
example, relational governance was used to agree on practical issues, such as daily 
communication. However, the formal contract was always in the background. 
In addition to the three established contract functions––safeguarding, adaptation, 
and coordination––we found that contracts served several other functions. In 
particular, they were used to codify the deal, to manage the internal division of work 
and responsibilities inside an organization, and to strategically guide the present and 
future collaboration of the contracting parties. 
The first additional function identified was the codification function of a 
contract. This refers to contractual techniques that put together and verbalize the deal 
for all the parties. Clauses that reflect the codification function include scope, roles 
and responsibilities, price, and delivery terms.  
Clauses that reflect the codification function, especially those related to the 
contract’s scope, were the most discussed in the interviews. The interviewees 
emphasized that contract scope, as well as the scope interfaces, needed to be clearly 
defined, and both parties had to have a mutual understanding of what the scope 
included. This also meant that contracts should be detailed, coherent, and not open 
to interpretation. If contracts were drafted clearly and understood by both parties, 
they enhanced trust and interorganizational exchange performance. 
However, if contracts failed to codify the deal properly and did not correctly 
reflect the details of the specific agreement between the parties, they hindered 
exchange performance. There were various reasons for why the contract did not 
reflect the agreed to terms. First, some contracts were unfit from the start because 
they were copied from a prior contract or contract template from a different industry, 
had missing information or contained non-applicable terms. The second reason why 
contracts were unfit for purpose was that the people who drafted the contract were 
not those responsible for executing them. This caused a misalignment between the 
documented terms and how the project was to be executed in reality. Third, contracts 
could become unfit over time; clauses that had been originally designed to support 
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exchange performance could lead to the opposite, because they no longer reflected 
the relationship and practice. 
The second additional function the interviewees described was the internal 
management function of a contract. When contracts were used for internal 
management, they aimed to communicate the objectives and scope of the deal not 
only to the people who had negotiated or drafted the contract but also to other internal 
personnel. An example of a clause that serves both the coordination function and the 
internal management function is a single point of contact clause, which is often used 
in relation to, for example, notices.  
Although the internal management function is directed first and foremost toward 
intrafirm work, it has indirect implications for the governance and performance of 
interorganizational exchanges. For example, if internal ambiguities result in the 
misallocation of resources, this can affect the interorganizational exchange 
relationship and cause reputational harm, among other things. 
Finally, companies used contracts to plan, promote and steer collaboration over 
the ongoing exchange. This function is referred to here as the collaboration function 
of a contract. Examples of clauses that were used by the participating companies and 
that served the collaboration function include pain and gain sharing clauses, open 
book clauses, clauses on licensing, options to extend or renew the contract, clauses 
that strategically coordinated the exchange relationship, and conflict management 
clauses that sought to resolve disputes amicably. Binding order forecasts, volume 
commitments, volume discounts, and supplier programs are also examples of 
collaborative clauses used by the participating companies in their supplier contracts. 
As noted by previous studies (e.g. Frydlinger et al. 2016), the need for 
collaborative clauses was emphasized in complex and long-term contracts, in for 
example, R&D, construction and information technology projects. The maturity of 
relational governance also influenced the use of collaborative clauses. For instance, 
when the parties knew and trusted each other they were more likely to use contracts 
that were more complex and included collaborative clauses, such as gain and pain 
sharing clauses or open book clauses. In other cases, however, the familiarity of the 
parties resulted in the role of the contract becoming less important. 
To summarize, the findings of Publication III contribute to and advance the 
theory of the functions of contracts. In essence, we found that in addition to 
safeguarding, adaptation and coordination, contracts were used to codify the deal, to 
manage internal workflows, and to strategically guide the interorganizational 
collaboration over the ongoing exchange. In other words, contracts were used in 
versatile ways, and these uses affected the development and utilization of relational 
governance as well as interorganizational exchange performance. Based on these 
results, we argue that considering the functions of a contract is fundamental to 
designing a contract that aims to complement relational governance and support 
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interorganizational exchange performance. If the relational dimensions of a contract, 
such as the collaboration function, are neglected, or the purpose and function of a 
specific contractual technique are not properly understood but implemented 
regardless of this, the contract can seriously hamper the development and use of 
relational governance and hinder exchange performance. 
4.3 Assessing the impacts of contract functions, 
framing and regulatory focus (Publication IV) 
Publication IV explores how the functional contracting approach can be used as a 
contract design framework to assess how organizations utilize the various 
contractual functions and how they frame their contracts. In the Publication, I present 
and discuss the results of a study in which I analyzed ten purchase contract 
documents of six companies that participated in the survey and the interview studies 
conducted as part of the DIMECC REBUS program.98 The analysis illustrates how 
the different functions of contracts are present in the “real world”––in the actual 
contracting practices of particular companies. Moreover, it shows how the 
distribution among the functions, the framing, and the possible mismatches between 
the different functions or between the functions and the framing influence the buyer-
supplier relationship that is created through the contract. In the following sections, I 
focus on the findings that are particularly relevant to the main research question 
posed in this summary. 
Overall, the analysis revealed that the most used contractual function was the 
safeguarding function, and that the clauses that served the collaboration and the 
policy99 functions were used the least. The analysis also showed that most of the 
contracts were framed preventively. Actually, only two contract clauses (one of 
which was optional) were framed promotively. This result is in line with those of 
previous studies and was unsurprising, as the contract documents generally 
supported arm’s-length buyer-supplier relationships. 
In relation to the first part of the main research question––What are the functions 
by which companies use contracts in their interorganizational exchange relations? –
–I found that in addition to safeguarding, codification, coordination, adaptation, 
internal management, and collaboration, the analyzed contracts also served a seventh 
function: policy. Clauses that serve the policy function require contracting parties to 
conform to policies related to exchange performance itself or to broader societal 
values, such as CSR. In other words, the policies can range from internal “best 
 
 
98  For more about the DIMECC REBUS research program, see Note 11. For more about 
the interview study, see Sub-chapter 3.2.2. 
99  For more about the policy function, see next paragraph. 
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efforts” clauses and supplier codes of conduct to voluntary CSR initiatives100 and 
multinational treaties, such as The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 
All but one of the analyzed contracts included policy clauses. Below is an 
example of such a clause: 
The Supplier agrees that its actions are not contradictory to the Purchaser's code 
of conduct. The Supplier also agrees to comply with all other applicable laws, 
regulations, international agreements and treaties, including but not limited to 
those related to the use of child labor, environmental issues and human rights. 
Regarding the relations between contract functions and their framing, the analysis 
revealed that although three of the analyzed contract templates claimed specifically 
to be based on the principles of long-term collaboration and mutual gains between 
the buyer and the supplier (Interview with a Procurement Manager of Company 11, 
reported in Publication III; Interview with a Procurement Manager of Company 15, 
), almost all the contracts contained inconsistencies in terms of (1) the functions the 
individual clauses were intended to serve, (2) the clause framings and the functions 
they were intended to serve, and (3), the general collaborative purpose of the contract 
and specific contract terms. 
Most inconsistencies were found in clauses that served the collaboration 
function. The general observation was that clauses that were intended to serve 
collaboration were, in fact, designed in a manner that underlined the safeguarding 
function. Moreover, these clauses were often one-sided as they highlighted only the 
obligations of the supplier. 
The following two examples illustrate the issues relating to the inconsistent use 
of contract functions and their framing. The first extract shows how a collaborative 




100  One example of a voluntary CSR initiative is the United Nations Global Compact, 
which was launched by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000. The Global 
Compact aims to mobilize a global movement of sustainable companies and 
stakeholders by helping companies conduct responsible business practices. According 
to the Global Compact, this can be achieved by aligning company strategies and 
operations with the Ten Principles on human rights, labor, environment and anti-
corruption, and by taking strategic actions to advance broader societal goals, such as 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The Global Compact is signed by more than 
13 000 companies and over 160 countries. See United Nations Global Compact 2021. 
Another example of a voluntary CSR initiative is the Global Reporting Initiative, see 
GRI 2021.  
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The Buyer is entitled to demand technical changes for parts, and Supplier shall 
propose any technical changes it deems necessary or advisable. Upon written 
consent by the Buyer, the Supplier will execute these changes. 
The Supplier shall notify the Buyer without delay of additional costs and 
adjustments to delivery times that result from technical changes. The changes 
will be binding only after a written supplementary agreement has been 
concluded between the Parties concerning the additional costs and/or 
adjustments to delivery times. 
In essence, even though the clause is presumably designed to support collaboration, 
the second paragraph focuses only on safeguarding the buyer’s rights.  
The second example illustrates how a similar (but not identical) clause is designed 
to support collaboration: 
If the Supplier notices any defect, discrepancy or inconsistency in the 
specifications, it shall notify the Buyer thereof without undue delay. The Buyer 
is liable for the correctness of the specifications and the information therein. The 
Supplier should, however, make its best efforts to detect possible defects, 
discrepancies and inconsistencies. In these circumstances, the delivery time will 
be adjusted accordingly. 
Further, while the overall intent of the contract was collaborative, this intent was 
blurred because different functions and framings were used inconsistently. As an 
example, even if the contract was intended to be collaborative, only the buyer had 
the right to: 
…use names, brands, trademarks, commercial and other relations of the Buyer 
or the Buyer and the Supplier as well as names of the Buyer or the Buyer and 
the Supplier personnel for advertising, sales promotion or in any other way for 
commercial activities. 
The supplier, in turn, needed written approval from the buyer to use this information. 
In relation to the second part of the main research question––What is the 
relationship between contract functions and relational governance?––the results 
corroborate the findings of Publication III; the supplier agreements included an 
abundance of clauses that served the safeguarding function and were excessively 
one-sided. The most blatant example ruled that if the supplier did not send the 
invoice within 90 days of delivery, it could no longer claim payment for the delivered 
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items from the buyer. These kinds of clauses are overly safeguarding and, depending 
on jurisdiction, a court could even find them void.  
Most of the clauses were not this extreme, but many of them either limited the 
liabilities of the buyer or granted rights solely to the buyer. Examples of such clauses 
included the right to postpone deliveries, the right to assign the contract, termination 
rights, the right to use the case as a reference, and rights to intellectual property. 
While the use of one-sided clauses may occasionally be justified in strategic terms, 
the excessive use of one-sided safeguarding can hinder overall exchange 
performance and decrease satisfaction with the exchange relationship. These are 
serious disadvantages for both the supplier and the buyer (e.g. Poppo & Zhou 2014).  
In sum, the analysis revealed that contracts are still designed according to the 
logic of TCE, highlighting the need to safeguard one’s own interests against the 
opportunistic behavior of the other contracting party. Although the approach is 
sometimes strategically justifiable, it can negatively affect overall satisfaction with 
the supplier-buyer relationship and hamper proper exchange performance, at least if 
applied to the extreme. Thus, I argue that organizations should consciously and 
critically assess the contracts that they use in their interorganizational exchange 
relationships. The functional contracting framework can help organizations assess 
the content and purpose of each contract clause and the main functions they are 
intended to serve. Furthermore, organizations can use the framework to assess the 
distribution of the contractual functions and whether there are inconsistencies 
between the individual clause functions and framings or, in general, in the functions, 
the framing, and the desired relationship type.   
On a theoretical front, I argue that the use of the functional contracting 
framework can fundamentally change the manner in which we construct contracts 
and make sense of them. This may, in turn, diversify the theoretical understanding 
of and discussions on the purpose, functions, and influences of contracts. Next I 
discuss these theoretical contributions and their relation to previous research.  
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5 Toward a functional turn in 
contracting? 
This chapter re-examines the findings of the Publications in relation to the main 
research question posed in this summary: What are the functions by which 
companies use contracts in their interorganizational exchange relations, and what 
is the relationship between contract functions and relational governance in these 
relations? It also links the findings to the different theoretical discussions and 
previous research presented in Chapter 2. I first discuss the findings concerning 
the functions by which companies use contracts in their interorganizational 
exchange relations. Essentially, the findings add to the functional contracting 
approach by introducing four additional functions of contracts: the codification 
function, the internal management function, the collaboration function, and the 
policy function. I then assess the findings that relate to the relationship between 
the contracts, contractual functions and relational governance, and suggest that 
when contracts are used functionally, they complement relational governance 
throughout the contract’s lifecycle. Subsequently, I discuss the findings that relate 
to the contracting capabilities that are required to affect the shift toward the 
functional use of contracts. Thereafter, I elaborate on the findings that illustrated 
the weaknesses and the disadvantages of the traditional understanding of contracts 
and contracting. Finally, I discuss the implications of the functional contracting 
approach to contract theory, research, teaching and managerial practice. I conclude 
the chapter by considering the limitations of this study and by suggesting possible 
future avenues of research. 
5.1 The seven functions of contracts 
The traditional view of contracts held by both organizational and management scholars 
and legal scholars tends to underline the legal safeguarding function of a contract. 
However, scholars in both fields have gradually started to focus on functions other 
than safeguarding, and research has called for more detailed studies on how the various 
functions are represented and operationalized in contracting practice.  
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This dissertation draws on TCE, relational contract theory, the relational view, 
functional contracting, proactive contracting, contract design research, and contract 
framing research. It develops a holistic view of the different functions of a contract. 
Based on the findings presented in Publications I–IV, I argue that in addition to the 
three established functions conceptualized by the functional contracting approach––
safeguarding, adaptation and coordination––contracts serve four additional 
functions: codification, internal management, collaboration, and policy. To 
summarize, the following table (Table 3) explains the seven functions of contracts 
and provides example clauses from the contract documents that formed the empirical 
data of Publication IV.  
A contractual function refers to a contractual technique, such as a single contract 
clause or a combination of various clauses, which is used to affect certain actions in 
the exchange relationship. For example, clauses that codify the exchange aim to 
communicate the content of the deal to both contracting parties so that they have a 
mutual understanding of the expectations, scope and exchange relationship. Another 
example is clauses that aim to coordinate the roles and responsibilities and the 




101  One might argue that the word purpose would be better to describe the contractual 
techniques I refer to in this dissertation. However, I have decided to use the concept of 
“function” for several reasons. First, it is derived from the functional contracting 
approach, which specifically studies the various functions of contracts. Thus, the 
concept is well known, at least in this field of study. Second, the concept of the purpose 
of contract is widely used in contracting practice to describe the background and the 
context of the exchange relationship, the purpose of the exchange, and the general 
purpose and content of the contract. Finally, the word function refers to active doing, 
and I wish to highlight that contracts and contract clauses are actually capable of 
influencing and making things happen. Thus, I decided to refrain from using the word 
purpose in this work. As a side note, for me, value creation is the main purpose of 
exchange relationships (if the exchange does not create value there is no point in 
making the deal in the first place). 
Toward a functional turn in contracting? 
 77 
Table 3. Functions of contracts with explanations and example clauses. Adapted from 
Hurmerinta-Haanpää forthcoming. Used with permission. 
Contract function What does it do? Example clause 
Previously established functions 
Safeguarding Safeguards the rights of one or 
both contracting parties either 
against the opportunism of the 
other party or one-sidedly. 
In the event of all or part of the 
assignment being delayed past the 
agreed completion date or milestone 
date(s), the Supplier shall pay 
liquidated damages of X% of the 
order value as specified in the 
purchase order for each commencing 
week for which the assignment is 
delayed. The liquidated damages 
shall not, however, exceed X% of the 
order value. 
Coordination Organizes the responsibilities, 
tasks and communication of 
the parties throughout the 
contract’s lifecycle. 
The Parties shall set up a project 
organization to implement this 
agreement and to organize the 
cooperation between the Parties. 
Adaptation Adapts the relationship to 
possible endogenous or 
exogenous changes. 
As a result of a significant decrease in 
the costs of labor, materials or other 
costs of manufacture, the Parties are 
obliged at the request of the 
Purchaser to negotiate a 
corresponding decrease in the price 
of the products. Should the result of 
such negotiations fail to reflect the 
decrease of the costs, the Purchaser 
has the right to terminate any orders 
without further liability to the Supplier. 
Additional functions identified in this research 
Codification Codifies, verbalizes, and 
communicates the deal to the 
contracting parties. 
Pursuant to the terms and conditions 
of this contract, the Supplier agrees 
to manufacture and deliver parts to 
the Buyer, as listed in Annex 1, 
according to the data set for quality, 
logistics and delivery terms specified 
in this Contract. 
Internal management Helps manage the internal 
workflows, tasks, and 
responsibilities of an 
organization. 
All orders are sent by the Buyer in 
writing. The Supplier may not 
accept orders by phone or 
otherwise orally unless they are 
later confirmed by a written order. 
Collaboration Organizes, promotes and 
steers both ongoing and future 
collaboration between the 
contracting parties. 
Cooperation between the Parties shall 
be developed jointly. The Parties shall 
set annual goals for their cooperation, 
and the cooperation will be evaluated 
periodically. Both parties shall name 
their cooperation contact persons. 
Policy Requires the contracting 
parties to conform to policies 
related to exchange 
performance itself or to 
broader societal values. 
The Supplier shall comply with the 
Buyer’s Responsibility Framework 
and Policies, including the Buyer’s 
Supplier Code, as amended from 
time to time. 
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It is important to understand that these functions can operate simultaneously, and 
that different contract clauses or bundles of clauses can reflect many functions. 
Moreover, the relevance of the different functions depends on the contract type and 
context. For instance, clauses that serve the coordination, adaptation and 
collaboration functions might be used more often in long-term contracts, whereas 
safeguarding clauses and codification clauses might be used more often in exchanges 
that are task specific and require technical precision. It might even be that 
collaborative contract clauses are unnecessary in simple, routine and short-term 
contracts.102 Next, I move on to describe the functions identified during this research 
project in more detail. 
First, the codification function of a contract refers to contractual techniques that 
codify, verbalize and communicate the deal to the contracting parties. Clauses that 
reflect the codification function include scope, roles and responsibilities, price, and 
delivery terms. This function seemed to be the most often referred to function in the 
interviews (Publication III) and the second most used contract function in the 
contract documents analyzed for Publication IV. Yet it has gained only limited 
attention in previous research. For example, in the field of organizational and 
management research, only a few studies have focused on this function. First, 
Lumineau et al. (2011: 22) found in their case study analysis that companies used a 
contract drafting process and detailed contracts to codify their goals and expectations 
and to grasp a better understanding of the overall deal. This way, contracts forced 
parties to carefully elaborate on each dimension of the exchange relationship. 
Second, Mayer & Argyres (2004) found in a case study of recurrent contracts 
between the same contracting parties that provisions were added to the recurrent 
contracts for the purpose of codifying the “lessons from previous experiences in the 
relationship” (Mayer & Argyres 2004: 404). In contract law scholarship, many 
scholars refer to similar uses of contracts but use a different word to describe this 
function. For example, Suchman (2003) uses the metaphor of a contract as a script, 
encouraging parties to elaborate on their expectations and roles before the final 
contract is signed. Similarly, proponents of the proactive contracting approach have 
conceptualized contracts as blueprints, visible scripts and roadmaps of the deal 
(Haapio & Haavisto 2005; Rekola & Haapio 2011; Nuottila & Nystén-Haarala 
2019). Hadfield & Bozovic’s (2016) interviewee also mentioned this function by 
describing how contracts are used as reference documents (Hadfield & Bozovic 
 
 
102  Frydlinger & Hart (2020: 5) come to a similar conclusion in the case of a formal 
relational contract. In particular, they consider that a traditional contract without the 
guiding principles of a formal relational contract is sufficient in routine situations in 
which unanticipated events are rare. For more about the formal relational contract, see 
Note 44. 
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2016: 1008)  Finally, referring to Collins (1999: 15), Dietz (2012: 39) argues that the 
most important function of contracts is communication, “so that everyone knows 
what one talks about and what is expected” (Dietz 2012: 39, extract from G-IX 
interview). All these conceptualizations of legal scholars seem to combine elements 
from both the codification function and the coordination function of a contract. 
Second, contracts served the internal management function by organizing 
intrafirm roles, responsibilities, and communication. Previous research on this 
function is limited.  Mayer & Argyres (2004) and Macaulay (1963) prove exceptions 
by describing how contracts are used for internal planning, management and 
communication, thereby preventing customers’ unwanted concessions by salesmen, 
delivery delays, misallocation of resources, and reputational harms (Macaulay 1963: 
65; Mayer & Argyres 2004: 398–399, 404). Bernstein (2015) also discusses specific 
contractual techniques that serve the internal management function: supplier 
scorecards. According to Bernstein, these scorecards, along with regular supplier 
evaluation meetings, mitigate the risk of procurement managers favoring “certain 
suppliers out of feelings of friendship or loyalty, even when they are not the best 
suppliers available” (Bernstein 2015: 596). 
Third, contracts were used to organize, promote and steer both ongoing and future 
collaboration between the contracting parties. In short, collaborative contract clauses 
aim to create a strategic collaborative relationship that spans beyond the individual 
exchange. Clauses that serve the collaboration function include strategic programs for 
collaboration, highlighting trust, communication, commitment, knowledge sharing, 
and information exchange (Schöttle et al. 2014: 1274–1275; Bernstein 2015; 
Frydlinger et al. 2016). While Macneil (1968) already recognized that contracts should 
be viewed as instruments for social cooperation, the historical burden of the 
neoclassical economic model––the arm’s-length sourcing strategy that flourished until 
the 1980s––and overemphasis on opportunism led to a situation in which the social 
and relational dimensions of contracts were disregarded and contracts were seen to 
hinder the creation of trusting business relationships (Macaulay 1963; Gulati 1995; 
Ghosal & Moran 1996; Uzzi 1997; Dyer 1997; Dyer & Singh 1998; Frydlinger et al. 
2016). In today’s global economy in which two-thirds of production is organized in 
value chains and networks (WTO 2019: 1), the need for collaboration that is supported 
by not only relational governance but also by contracts is evident (e.g. Frydlinger et 
al. 2016: 10). Fortunately, recent publications by contract law scholars as well as 
practitioners have focused on contracts that include these social dimensions. For 
example, in Gilson et al.’s (2009, 2010, 2013, 2014) theory of braided agreements, 
formal contract terms that allow transparency, encourage information sharing and 
increase switching cost are used to support the development of relational governance 
in situations in which the parties are new to each other. Similarly, Jennejohn (2008) 
introduces the idea of generative contracts that act as learning devices and thereby limit 
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opportunism. More recently, Bernstein (2015) has explored a variety of contractual 
mechanisms that large American industrial buyers use to facilitate relational 
governance in highly cooperative procurement relationships. She concludes that the 
goals of these kinds of contracts include not only the safeguarding of contractual 
performance but also the creation of “a framework for an ongoing contracting 
relationship, a framework that is structured to build the types of relational and 
structural social capital that will enable the parties to identify and take advantage of 
future value-creating opportunities” (Bernstein 2015: 615). Finally, Frydlinger et al. 
(2016) urge companies to use formal relational contracts that are based on the idea of 
a partnership, and to establish a society of social norms to guide the behaviors of 
contracting parties. As with collaborative contract clauses, the focus of these formal 
relational contracts of Frydlinger et al. (2016) is on guiding the overarching exchange 
relationship. 
Fourth, contracts served the policy function, which refers to contractual 
techniques that require contracting parties to conform to policies that can relate to 
exchange performance itself or to broader societal values, such as CSR. The policy 
requirements can be set either in the contract document itself or the contract 
document can include references to external policies, such as company codes of 
conduct, industry standards, or international self-governance tools. Examples of 
policies that relate directly to exchange performance are broad standards of 
performance, such as “best effort” clauses (e.g. Gilson et al. 2010), clauses requiring 
organizations to have a certain number of full-time employees working on the 
project, or clauses requiring organizations to assign employees with a certain 
qualification to work for the project (e.g. Schepker et al. 2014: 212). These types of 
clauses are common in exchanges in which the outcome is hard to determine ex ante, 
for example, innovation contracts (e.g. Gilson et al. 2010).  In turn, an example of 
policy clauses that enforce broader societal values are clauses that require suppliers 
to follow voluntary CSR initiatives. These kinds of clauses have become popular 
quite recently103 and today they are even cascaded down to the entire supply chain 
(e.g. Salminen 2019: 60–61 with references, 64). Although organizations sometimes 
 
 
103  For example, terms related to adherence to policies were the 20th most negotiated term 
in a survey by WorldCC in 2020. It is the first time in the 20 year-long history of the 
survey that these terms are on the list. See WorldCC 2020. Smith & King (2009) explain 
the phenomenon using institutional theory, suggesting that organizations seek 
legitimacy by adopting “certain contractual elements that conform to developing 
standards of rational organizational behavior” (Smith & King 2009: 37). 
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use these kinds of clauses for appearance only, they are generally meant to move 
industry practices in a more sustainable direction.104  
To sum up, the functional contracting approach recognizes that contracts serve 
various functions: To start with, they can codify the agreed-to deal and verbalize it 
to the contracting parties. Moreover, contracts can coordinate parties’ actions, and 
can be used to guide an organization’s internal workflows and communication. 
Contracts can be also used to prepare for possible changes in circumstances by 
setting out procedures for adjustment and change management. Furthermore, 
although the functional contracting approach underlines the various functions of a 
contract, it also considers the possibility of opportunism in exchange relations. Thus, 
contracts also serve as safeguards to secure both parties’ interests during the 
exchange and in cases of conflict. Contracts can be used to guide the parties to 
develop and deliver the deal in a way that shows commitment to best efforts and to 
sustainable business practices. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, contract 
clauses serving the collaboration function focus on the interorganizational exchange 
relationship by creating a fertile ground for collaboration and by supporting the 
development of trust and other forms of relational governance.  
Next I address the possibilities of the functional understanding of contracts and 
the relationship between contract functions and relational governance. 
5.2 The relationship between the functional contracting 
approach and relational governance 
As argued and discussed in Publications I and II, the functional contracting process 
can be used as a precontractual integration tool to coordinate and guide the 
negotiation process, to align the expectations and value perceptions of network 
participants, and to implement changes in the network participants’ attitudes and 
decision-making policies. In the words of Gilson et al. (2009, 2010, 2013, 2014), the 
functional contracting process introduced in Publications I and II braids the formal 
and informal governance mechanisms in a succession of MoUs to enable the parties 
 
 
104  For more about the historical developments of using private governance to promote the 
sustainability of transnational production, see Locke 2013. Unfortunately, as noted by 
Salminen (2017, 2019), voluntary private governance is not sufficient for addressing 
sustainability-related problems; private law liability and public regulation is also 
needed. In his doctoral dissertation, Salminen (2017) proposes a novel regime of 
production liability, in which lead firms would be liable not only for production-related 
contingencies toward users of goods but also toward other actors, such as labor and the 
environment. For current laws governing sustainability in contractually organized value 
chains, see Salminen 2019: 68–69. Moreover, the drafting of an international UN treaty 
to regulate transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights is under way. See Business & Human Rights Resource Center 2020. 
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to examine whether the business case is worth pursuing. At the same time, it binds 
the parties to negotiate in good faith. Thereby, like the relational contracting process 
introduced by Frydlinger et al. (2016), formal MoUs attempt to build a fair 
contracting process, discourage opportunism and prohibit the unauthorized use of 
information disclosed during negotiations. In other words, the formal contract-like 
documents guide the processes that are usually governed by relational governance. 
In our case, the utilization of relational governance mechanisms was out of question 
because the parties were new to each other and trust had yet to develop. As previous 
research suggests, formal governance is especially used in the early phases of 
collaboration to convince the parties of their mutual engagement to the process, 
which in turn enables trust to develop (e.g. Mayer & Argyres 2004: 407; Gilson et 
al. 2010: 1415; Frydlinger et al. 2016: 25). 
Along with promoting the development of trust and mitigating opportunism, the 
functional contracting process introduced in Publications I and II acts as a gesture 
that signifies commitment to negotiations. When parties put their thoughts into 
writing, the weight of commitment changes (e.g. Suchman 2003: 113; Hart & Moore 
2008: 12–13; Viljanen et al. 2020: 19; Frydlinger & Hart 2020: 23) even though the 
legal enforceability of the MoUs may differ from the enforceability of traditional 
contracts (e.g. Gilson et al. 2010: 1415–1422; Hadfield & Bozovic 2016:1000; 
Viljanen et al. 2018b: 162; Viljanen et al. 2020: 18). For example, the breach of a 
soft contract obligation, such as the obligation to negotiate in good faith, may not 
result in the same remedy as the breach of a hard obligation (e.g. Gilson et al. 2010: 
1415–1422). Nevertheless, codifying the framework for negotiations into the MoUs 
brings social norms to formal contract documents, thereby creating a paper trail of 
the negotiation process and bringing discipline to the relationship (Frydlinger et al. 
2016: 4, 26). 
In addition to complementing relational governance and facilitating 
precontractual integration during negotiations, contracts that utilize the various 
functions described in this dissertation complement relational governance 
throughout the exchange and even beyond. During negotiations, processing contract 
clauses that codify the deal enable parties to align their goals and expectations and 
gain information about the other party’s intentions and motivations (e.g. Suchman 
2003: 112–113; Gilson et al. 2009, 2010; Hadfield & Bozovic 2016: 1016).  In the 
post-award phase105, the codifying clauses, together with coordinative contract 
 
 
105  The term “post award” refers to phases that follow the contract signing and include, for 
example, contract execution and change management. “Pre-award” phases take place 
prior to contract signature. The terms are widely used in contract management practice 
and by contract management expert organizations, such as the WorldCC and the 
American National Contract Management Association (NCMA). 
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clauses, act as valuable roadmaps and scripts to guide the parties’ performance 
(Suchman 2003; Haapio & Haavisto 2005; Haapio & Rekola 2011).  In this way, 
contracts can enhance the development of trust and reduce misunderstandings related 
to scope and scope interfaces (Mayer & Argyres 2004: 401). Moreover, by bringing 
the social norms of the exchange relationship to the formal contract document, 
collaborative contract clauses aim to build a relationship that is based on fairness, 
even in situations in which a contract needs to be adjusted or interpreted in a new 
light (Poppo & Zhou 2014; Frydlinger et al. 2016). 
Furthermore, when close attention is paid to contract framing, the contract 
reflects the desired exchange relationship and induces behavior that is desirable for 
that specific relationship. It is important to note that while neither preventive nor 
promotive contract framing is undesirable per se, the framing should always match 
the transactional attributes and the behavior that is desired for the successful 
performance of the exchange. Moreover, framing should be applied consistently 
throughout the contract and not only to a single contract clause (e.g. Weber et al. 
2011: 199; Weber & Mayer 2011: 69). This ensures that a contract, together with 
relational governance, enables a well-functioning exchange relationship (e.g. Weber 
& Mayer 2011: 71). 
The findings also suggest that the relationship between contracts and relational 
governance is bi-directional: relational governance complements contracts and vice 
versa. For example, the interviewees in Publication III described how coordinative 
contract clauses were complemented by relational governance when the parties 
agreed on practical issues such as daily communication. Moreover, as in previous 
studies, the interviewees indicated that relational governance was used to 
complement formal contracts in cases of changed circumstances (e.g. Macaulay 
1963: 60–62; Poppo & Zenger 2002: 721; Hadfield & Bozovic 2016: 993–994). 
Relational governance also complemented collaborative contract terms: When 
relational governance developed over the course of the exchange relation, it 
encouraged the parties to use more complex and collaborative contract clauses. Some 
researchers have debated the question of whether experience gained from a prior 
relationship and the relational governance developed during that relationship leads 
to more or less contractual detail (e.g. Gulati 1995; Poppo & Zenger 2002; Mayer & 
Argyres 2004; Ryall & Sampson 2009), but I believe that the relationship between 
the two governance mechanisms is more complex. On the one hand, parties may rely 
more on relational governance in long-term relationships (e.g. Gulati 1995; Dyer 
1997). On the other hand, an increased level of trust and the utilization of other 
relational governance mechanisms can also lead to more complex contracts (Mayer 
& Argyres 2004; Ryall & Sampson 2009; Mellewigt et al. 2012). Moreover, different 
contract functions also have a role to play here. It seems that prior relationships have 
a stabilizing or slightly positive effect on the level of safeguarding clauses (e.g. 
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Mayer & Argyres 2004; Reuer & Ariño 2007; Ryall & Sampson 2009; Mellewigt et 
al. 2012). They also seem to promote the increasing use of adaptive and coordinative 
contract clauses (e.g. Mayer & Argyres 2004; Ryall & Sampson 2009; Mellewigt et 
al. 2012; Cao & Lumineau 2015), although the findings related to the increased use 
of adaptive and coordinative contract clauses are somewhat inconsistent (Reuer & 
Ariño 2007).106 The positive effect of prior ties on safeguarding clauses may seem 
counterintuitive, but the explanation might lie in the interplay between relational and 
formal governance: Partners who deal with each other repeatedly may find writing a 
detailed agreement worthwhile, not necessarily to be used in the case of a dispute in 
a court, but because it supports the relational governance between the parties (e.g. 
Ryall & Sampson 2009: 922–923).  
Indeed, this study corroborates the findings of previous research, suggesting that 
even though contracts specify legal remedies in the case of disputes, they are not 
used very often.  In cases of disputes, formal contracts are often put aside, and 
controversies are settled by informal means (e.g. Macaulay 1963: 61; WorldCC 
2014; Hadfield & Bozovic 2016: 998; Frydlinger et al. 2016: 15). This raises the 
question of why parties write these clauses into the contracts in the first place. Like 
Cao & Lumineau (2015: 30), I believe that even though legal sanctions are not used, 
the fact that they are included in a written contract supports the development of 
relational governance, which in turn reduces opportunism.107 
To sum up the findings concerning the relationship between contracts, contract 
functions and relational governance, it seems that contracts and relational 
governance are not substitutes, but that they complement each other. However, this 
result only holds for contracts that utilize the various functions of contracts. In 
essence, I argue that contracts that make each party’s expectations, values and 
behaviors more observable, reduce information asymmetry and improve justice 
perception, have a positive effect on trust and strengthen the impacts of relational 
governance on satisfaction and relationship performance (e.g. Mayer & Argyres 
2004: 407; Cao & Lumineau 2015: 30). However, if contracts are used in the 
traditional frame and mainly for safeguarding, it seems that they substitute rather 
than complement relational governance (e.g. Ghosal & Moran 1996; Cao & 
Lumineau 2015; Poppo & Cheng 2018). 
As the results of Publications I and II in particular indicate, the shift toward the 
functional contracting approach in business practices will not be easy. This is 
 
 
106  Reuer &Ariño (2007) found that prior ties did not influence the level of safeguarding 
clauses that were used in subsequent exchanges. Instead, repeat collaborators were less 
likely to adopt coordinative provisions in their contracts. 
107  Interestingly, Cao & Lumineau (2015: 26) found that formal contracts did not 
themselves reduce the level of opportunism. 
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because the new approach disrupts current contracting practices and requires that 
different professionals who actually use contracts––such as lawyers, businesspeople, 
technical professionals, and financial professionals––change their attitudes toward 
contracts. In a word, they need to collaborate to create competitive advantage for 
their organizations (e.g. DiMatteo et al. 2012: 106; Haapio 2013: 82). Next, I 
elaborate on the findings concerning the contracting capabilities that are essential to 
drive this shift. 
5.3 What does turning toward the functional use of 
contracts entail? 
Turning toward the functional use of contracts requires that we reorient our 
understanding of contracts in various ways. First, we need to abandon the 
overemphasis on contracts as legal safeguards and to adopt a proactive view of them. 
This entails that contracts are understood as both promotive managerial tools that 
can be used to enable business success and to add to a company’s competitive 
advantage and as preventive legal tools that prevent undesired risks from realizing 
(e.g. Haapio 1998; DiMatteo et al. 2012; Haapio 2013). 
Second, contract design processes should be informed not only by TCE and 
relational contract theory, but also by the contract design research discussed in this 
study, including research on the various functions of contracts, the relationship 
between contracts and relational governance, and contract framing. In essence, 
contract design should result in user-friendly contracts that match the desired 
interorganizational relationship, support collaboration, and enable successful 
business outcomes (see also Figure 3).  
Third, the results of this dissertation highlight the need for cross-professional 
collaboration when adopting the functional approach to contracting. They also point 
to the need for diverse contracting capabilities. Previous research on contracting 
capabilities suggests that some experts possess stronger contracting capabilities than 
others in relation to particular types of contracts, contract clauses or negotiations. 
For example, Argyres & Mayer (2007) suggest that managers and engineers are more 
suitable than lawyers for drafting clauses on roles and responsibilities, 
communication, and certain parts of contingency planning clauses, as these kinds of 
clauses require firm-specific and tacit knowledge. Lawyers, in turn, possess stronger 
contract design capabilities related to, for example, clauses on dispute resolution and 
IPR. Weber & Mayer (2006) also propose that, depending on the knowledge needed 
to complete the task of drafting a contract template or negotiating a deal, different 
stakeholders (internal counsel, external counsel, managers and engineers, and 
purchasing/sales agents) should be involved with distinct inputs (sole actor, team 
leader or team participant). In relation to contract framing, research suggests that 
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because of their plausible tendency toward prevention, lawyers may better frame 
contract clauses that deal with safeguarding and monitoring, while technical 
professionals might be better suited to negotiating contract clauses that require 
creativity and flexibility (Mayer & Weber 2009: 14–16; Weber & Mayer 2011: 73). 
Indeed, the results of this study indicate that even though legal expertise is 
required when drafting legal terms such as IPR clauses, lawyers are sometimes seen 
as adversely impacting negotiations, contract drafting, and the development of 
relational governance. In line with previous research, the findings suggest that 
contract drafting should no longer be left solely to lawyers (e.g. Nuottila et al. 2016). 
Instead, it should be a cross-professional endeavor that recognizes and involves the 
various contract users, such as contract managers, business managers, sales 
professionals, procurement managers, in-house counsels, financial experts, and 
technical professionals. In addition, a mature contracting capability would focus on 
the manifold contexts of use and the goals of the different users: In other words, it 
would design more user-friendly contracts (e.g. Haapio 2013: 55, Table 9; Kujala et 
al. 2015: 101). Moreover, a mature contracting capability would utilize the 
knowledge on the antecedents and influences of contract framing (e.g. Weber et al. 
2011: 199; Rich et al. forthcoming: 2). The shift toward cross-professional 
contracting capability requires, however, that lawyers welcome other professionals 
to plan contracting processes and contracts, and that managers start to see law as a 
potential source of competitive advantage, as opposed to the traditional view of law 
as a hindrance or a cost that only lawyers can manage (Bird & Orozco 2014; Orozco 
2021). 
5.4 Dangers of continuing on the traditional path  
Like previous studies, I found that safeguarding was still one of the most used 
contractual functions (e.g. Argyres & Mayer 2004: 404; Nystén-Haarala et al. 2010: 
471–472). This finding is understandable from a historical perspective: The 
neoclassical economic model of contracting and the system of classical contract law 
guided contract theory and contracting practice until the mid-20th century (e.g. 
Nystén-Haarala et al. 2010: 463). As Macaulay (1963) reported, many deals were 
completed without reference to the contract, and managers often felt that establishing 
a contract could “get in the way of creating good exchange relationships” (Macaulay 
1963: 64). From the 1980s onwards, globalization and new business practices that 
were based on fragmented production changed the contracting environment: Local, 
long-term contracts were replaced by relationships in which the contracting parties 
did not know each other and even resided on the other side of the globe. This change 
resulted in the need to govern these uncertain exchange relations by complete 
contracts that safeguarded the parties against opportunism and were based on the 
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idea of an arm’s-length relationship. Today, due to the interdependency of 
organizations along with a networked and hyper-competitive economy, these types 
of contract do not work (Frydlinger et al. 2016: 13). In fact, based on my research 
findings, these kinds of contracts negatively affect interorganizational exchange 
relationships. 
To begin with, excessive use of (one-sided) safeguarding clauses can hinder the 
creation and development of relational governance and encourage conflict, thus 
negatively affecting exchange performance. Contracts that include a high number of 
safeguarding clauses can encourage the parties to vigilantly follow the contract to 
the letter and focus excessively on the partner’s possible deviations from the 
contract. This creates a spiral of suspicion, pressure and retaliation, which in turn 
encourages opportunism and undermines collaboration and joint problem-solving 
(e.g. Ghoshal & Moran 1996; Moeller et al. 2006; Frydlinger et al. 2016; Schilke & 
Lumineau 2018). Further, a partner’s assessment of the other party’s task 
performance and satisfaction with the relationship declines if a contract focuses 
solely on safeguarding (Poppo & Zhou 2014). The quality of performance can also 
be endangered by overly constricted specifications and policing (Matthyssens & Van 
de Bulte 1994; Cova & Salle 2000; Moeller et al. 2006). Finally, these kinds of 
contracts (also referred to as power-based agreements) generate higher transaction 
costs than contracts that support relational governance (Willcocks & Cullen 2005) 
and are one reason for the value leakage of 9.15% in contractual relations (WorldCC 
2012; Frydlinger et al. 2016: 11–14).108 
Keeping up with old contract drafting traditions, such as leaving the lawyers to 
draft the contracts alone, can result in the contract not reflecting the actual content 
of the deal or the relationship of the parties. In the words of Macaulay (2003), the 
real deal does not translate into the paper deal. Moreover, excluding the actual users 
of the contract from the contract design process poses the real risk that, even if the 
lawyers are able to capture the real deal in the paper deal, the users will not 
comprehend its content because it is not user friendly, only lawyer friendly (e.g. 
Haapio 2013: 50–56; Haapio & Barton 2018). In these situations, the contract is left 
in a safe, while important decisions concerning the real deal are made informally. 
These practices create a spiral, which causes the contract document to be seen as an 
unimportant, rigid, inflexible legal tool unsuitable for managing, not to mention 
facilitating, collaboration (e.g. Kujala et al. 2015: 101).  
 
 
108  Indeed, WorldCC found in their 2012 survey that contracts underperform by 
approximately 9%. See WorldCC 2012. Although there are various reasons for this 
underperformance, the report suggests that the traditional, transactional approach to 
contracting explains much of the value leakage. See also Frydlinger et al. 2016: 11–14. 
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Previous research has discussed the various reasons behind the differences 
between the real deal and the paper deal. In relation to lawyers, one reason is the 
overutilization of contract templates, even in situations in which the templates do not 
fit the deal (e.g. Haapio 2013: 50–51; Anderson 2020: 569). In addition, research 
suggests that lawyers lack business intelligence: Although they seem to acknowledge 
the importance of business objectives, they struggle to address these issues in 
contracts (e.g. Nuottila et al. 2016; Nuottila 2019). Finally, lawyers’ traditional 
training, which ignores the economic and managerial aspects of exchanges, 
influences their drafting habits (e.g. Nystén-Haarala 2006: 264; Siedel & Haapio 
2010: 673–674; Haapio 2013: 51). Based on my research, I suggest two additional 
reasons for the prevailing contracting habits of lawyers: First, their self-indulgence, 
and second, the fear of what would happen if the entire contract drafting process, 
along with its end product (the contract document), was reoriented toward a 
functional framework. Simply put, keeping up with old habits is easier because there 
is no need to step out of one’s comfort zone, and safer because everyone knows (or 
believes they know) what to expect from traditional contracts. 
5.5 The implications of the functional contracting 
approach for contract theory, research and teaching 
Adopting the functional approach to contracting brings about changes in the ways 
we understand contracts, their functions, and their effects on interorganizational 
exchange relations. It may also change the way we interpret contracts and develop 
general principles of contract law and contract law theory. Finally, it changes the 
ways in which legal scholars teach and study contracts. 
To begin with, adopting the functional approach to contracts changes the way in 
which we understand contracts. The neoclassical economic model and the system of 
classical contract law presumes that contracts are legal safeguards of the deal into 
which the parties have voluntarily entered. TCE reorients this view by embracing the 
transactional-relational spectrum of Macneil and the adaptive and coordinative uses 
of contracts. However, it underlines the safeguarding function of a contract by 
focusing on ways to mitigate the opportunism that “plagues” all exchanges.  
In contrast to TCE, the functional approach does not focus on the fact that 
opportunism exists in every exchange relation. On the contrary, it challenges the 
overemphasis of TCE on opportunism by emphasizing that in addition to economic 
and legal safeguards, contracts are managerial tools capable of coordinating and 
managing relationships and developing collaboration. Moreover, the functional 
contracting approach acknowledges that contracts are influenced by various societal 
phenomena, such as legal culture, managerial practices, social structures and 
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institutions, and research, and that contracts themselves influence these practices 
(e.g. Suchman 2003).  
The functional approach challenges current contract law theories by introducing 
contractual techniques that these traditional theories do not recognize. Like adaptive 
contract clauses, such as agreements to agree, which were puzzling to common law 
courts some time ago109, clauses that serve, for example, the coordination or the 
collaboration function might seem abstract and vague in a traditional, legal sense, as 
they do not necessarily fix specific, clear duties and rights.110 Nonetheless, these 
kinds of clauses can have legal consequences. They might not be like the legal 
consequences of hard, traditional contracts (Gilson et al. 2009, 2010; Hadfield & 
Bozovic 2016): For example, a breach of the good faith negotiation obligation might 
not (and should not) result in expectation damages, but it can result in reliance 
damages. Thus, coordinative and collaborative contracting techniques extend the 
legal consequences of contracts to behavior that was formerly governed only by 
relational governance (Frydlinger et al. 2016). Perhaps even more importantly, 
however, the act of contracting the principles that govern collaboration can signify 
commitment to the relationship and add weight to these principles (Suchman 2003; 
Frydlinger et al. 2016). Agreeing on the principles of collaboration in the contract 
document brings them on a par with other, “harder” contractual rights and duties. 
This way, the functional approach to contracting multiplies the possible effectivity 
mechanisms of contracts. Moreover, by acknowledging that contracts can be used to 
bind not only the contracting parties, but also other members of the production 
network to adhere to policies related to, for example, CSR, the legal ramifications of 
contracts expand beyond contractual privity (e.g. Salminen 2017; Viljanen et al. 
2018b; Salminen 2019; Viljanen et al. 2020). 
In relation to contract law development and adjudication, the functional 
contracting approach could be a useful tool for operationalizing the ideas of the 
relational contract theory.111 First, the different functions and their representation in 
a contract could provide inductive information when deciding whether and to what 
degree the parties have committed to the principles of good faith and fair dealing. If 
the contract contained, for example, a great deal of collaborative and coordinative 
contract clauses, it would indicate that the parties’ purpose was to include relational 
 
 
109  Essentially, agreements-to-agree clauses were seen as contrary to the certainty doctrine 
of common law. See e.g. Salminen 2011. 
110  For more about the challenges related to the recognition of adaptive and coordinative 
contracting by contract law, see Viljanen et al. 2020: 12. In the context of formal 
relational contracts, Frydlinger & Hart (2020: 23) discuss the difficulty of enforcement. 
111  Relational contract theory has been criticized, partly without justification, for its 
uselessness in guiding contract interpretation in adjudication (see e.g. Nystén-Haarala 
1999: 205–206; Feinman 2000: 737–740). See also Notes 41 and 42. 
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aspects in the analysis of their relation. This way, courts could acknowledge and also 
enforce the relational elements of specific exchange relationships. On the other hand, 
a contract that included almost only preventively framed or even one-sided 
safeguarding clauses could indicate that the parties’ intent was to deal with possible 
needs for adaptation and flexibility outside the realms of the contract. In this case, a 
court might prefer textual interpretation. As already pointed out, however, the 
representation of various functions in a disputed contract would be only indicative, 
and like today, the final decision on the doctrines to be applied in a particular case 
would depend on the specific facts of the case. Second, in relation to contract law 
development, it might be worth considering whether particular types of highly 
collaborative contracts, such as long-term alliance contracts and consortia, would 
benefit from a separate relational contract law system that would underline the more 
relational types of common contract norms (such as reciprocity, flexibility, and 
contractual solidarity). I restrict the further analysis of these questions in this work, 
but my intention is to address them in my future studies. 
Adopting the functional approach in contract law research and teaching means, 
first of all, that law school students need to be taught with not only doctrinalist 
approaches to contract law (which are also important), but also with actual business 
and contracting practices and empirical studies of contracts (Nystén-Haarala 1998: 
250).112 This includes some basic knowledge of the economics of contracts as well 
as of the organizational, managerial, and psychological implications of contracts. 
Otherwise, students would only familiarize themselves with a fraction of contracting 
practices––the ones which end up in courts––and thus become estranged from most 
business and contracting reality. After all, most exchanges are completed without 
any conflicts, and if conflicts arise, they are usually settled without litigation (e.g. 
Macaulay 1963: 61; WorldCC 2014; Hadfield & Bozovic 2016: 998; Frydlinger et 
al. 2016: 15). Without a fuller picture of the contracting reality, it is impossible for 
law students to critically evaluate the existing contract law system and think of 
possible alternatives. On a more practical level, these students should gain 
knowledge and skills that are relevant to their future jobs. By studying actual contract 
practices and by adopting the functional contracting approach, they would gain the 
skills they need for drafting and managing contracts for interorganizational exchange 
relationships and solving problems arising from these relationships (Macaulay 1963: 
 
 
112  Many ANLR researchers have also called for a reform in legal education. For the latest 
call, see Poppe 2021, which argues for the reorientation of legal education to further 
the goals of ANLR. According to Poppe, this reform would: “(i) instill in students an 
appreciation for the value of empirical research; (ii) provide them with a framework for 
understanding the relationship between law and social science; and (iii) equip them 
with the knowledge necessary to engage critically with empirical data and analysis” 
(Poppe forthcoming: 201). 
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55, Note 2). If future lawyers were trained in this way, other professionals may start 
to see lawyers not only as legal professionals but also as business professionals 
(Haapio 2006b: 29–32; Nuottila 2019: 70–71).  
At the moment, in Finland, empirical, multidisciplinary studies of contracts are 
in their infancy. Apart from myself, only a handful of legal scholars have engaged 
in empirical studies of contracts and contracting practices.113 This is because 
traditionally, lawyers are not trained to conduct empirical research (Korkea-aho & 
Leino 2019: 18–19; Poppe 2021: 199).114 If we wish to increase the level of studies 
that combine insights from, for instance, economics, sociology, organizational and 
management studies, design science, and law, and to utilize empirical methods to 
study contracts and contracting practices, we must start by training our future 
researchers to use empirical methods and to collaborate with researchers from other 
disciplines. 
5.6 Managerial implications 
This work offers a number of learning points that are relevant to managers. First, the 
results of Publications I and II indicate that transitioning to a new business model 
with performance-based contracts presents several challenges that need to be 
overcome. In the Publications, we propose that one way to overcome them is to 
engage in value-based selling and to introduce a functional contracting process. The 
functional contracting process works as a precontractual integration tool, as it helps: 
1) align the expectations and interests of the network participants; 2) initiate and 
guide the development of appropriate organizational interfaces; 3) build trust; and 4) 
convince the network participants of the feasibility of the new business model. 
Publications III and IV, in turn, underline the fact that contracting professionals 
need to be aware of the different functions of contracts and their relationship with 
relational governance. In essence, they need to acknowledge that contracts are not 
neutral codifications of exchanges; they can be used to align expectations and 
interest, to manage the exchange relation, and to push businesses toward more 
sustainable production practices. Moreover, contracts can be used to guide intrafirm 
work and communication. Finally, they can be used to build and develop long-term 
collaboration. If the different functions of contracts and their framing, as well as their 
influence on relational governance and exchange performance, are not taken into 
 
 
113  Examples of such scholars include, Helena Haapio, Piia Kaave, Soili Nystén-Haarala, 
Soile Pohjonen and Mika Viljanen. In the US, the situation is similar, although it has 
improved during the past ten years. For the US situation in 2000s, see Smith & King 
2009: 19–24.  
114  At the moment, only two out of four law schools in Finland have sociology of law as a 
compulsory course for a law degree. 
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account, contracts can seriously hamper the creation and development of relational 
governance and have destructive effects on the exchange relation. Thus, I encourage 
organizations to critically assess their existing contracts and contracting practices, 
and to take corrective actions as needed. Publication IV even introduces a conceptual 
framework––the functional contracting framework––to help organizations in this 
endeavor. In addition to assessing an organization’s current contract practices, the 
framework can be used as a classification tool and a checklist during the contract 
drafting and design process. 
Recognizing that contracts can create a competitive advantage for the company 
is essential. Creating a competitive contracting capability calls for 
interorganizational and cross-professional collaboration throughout the contract’s 
lifecycle and beyond, from negotiations to the continuous development of exchange 
relations. Lawyers need to change their drafting habits, challenge their beliefs 
regarding the purposes and the possible uses of contracts, and engage in a supportive 
role during contract negotiations and to a certain extent during contract drafting. 
Moreover, lawyers need to change their focus from risk mitigation and prevention to 
enabling business success, and designing flexible, creative legal governance 
structures that support other governance mechanisms, such as relational norms. 
In addition to lawyers, changes are also required of other professionals. 
Stakeholders from outside the legal field need to become integral in the contract 
design process. This is because research shows that, in terms of clauses that require 
firm-specific and tacit knowledge, contracting capabilities reside outside the legal 
department (Argyres & Mayer 2007). Different professionals, involved in the 
exchange at different stages, are needed in the negotiation and design processes to 
ensure that the contract frame matches the transactional attributes and the desired 
relationship type, and that the contract does not contain provisions that are 
conflicting, purposeless or even hinder exchange performance. Instead, contracts 
should enable business success by being user-friendly, by reflecting the exchange as 
realistically as possible, supporting relational governance, and creating and 
supporting the desired relationship type. At best, contracts can be designed to 
encourage trust and make collaboration flourish. 
Changing dominant business practices and attitudes toward contracts is not easy. 
For example, cross-professional collaboration in contracting requires that different 
professionals overcome the cross-professional knowledge gap, which is 
characterized by challenges related to coordinating different perspectives, ways of 
doing, and goals and priorities (Passera et al. 2016: 85). However, the effort is 
worthwhile, as developing the organization’s contracting and legal capabilities 
creates a sustainable competitive advantage that is not easily imitable (e.g. Weber & 
Mayer 2006: 28; Mayer & Weber 2009: 7; DiMatteo et al. 2012: 106). This change 
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does not happen overnight, and further research on the value leakage of traditional 
contracting practices is essential to validate the need for change.  
5.7 Limitations 
Coming back to Macaulay’s (2005: 396) words about the limitations of empirical 
research on contracts, I admit that this study has several limitations. Although the 
limitations related to following the ethical principles for research with human 
participants (TENK 3/2019) and data management are discussed in Sub-chapter 3.3, 
and the limitations related to the qualitative methods used in this dissertation are 
discussed in detail in the Publications (specifically in Publications I and III) and in 
Sub-chapter 3.2, I will briefly elaborate on some of them again. I also discuss 
limitations related to the entire research project. 
The first limitation involves the nature of qualitative studies in general and 
especially the collaborative, explorative action research method. Qualitative research 
has been criticized because its quality is hard to assess and collaborative action 
research has been criticized for being biased and subjective (e.g. Werr & Greiner 
2008: 98). The fact that all the Publications have passed peer-review evaluation 
indicates rather firm acceptance of the methodological appropriateness of the 
individual studies. I have further aided the reader in assessing the quality of my 
research by describing the research processes and reflecting on them in detail in each 
Publication, as well as in Sub-chapter 3.2. As regards the critique of collaborative 
action research, it is hard to deny that the organization that participated in the 
financing of the research program and in the research project itself had no influence 
on defining the research theme (e.g. Nystén-Haarala 2017: 1028). Within this 
framework, however, we were able to independently define our more specific 
research problems, to collect and analyze data, to conceptualize problems, to present 
our results, and to offer the case company feedback.  
The second limitation is that the feasibility of the functional contracting tools 
(the functional contracting process and the functional contracting framework) were 
not tested in practice. This was because the company did not finalize any deal during 
the research project. In the case of the functional contracting framework presented 
in Publication IV, only ten purchase contract documents were evaluated. Future 
studies could focus on testing the tools in both qualitative and quantitative research 
settings. 
The third limitation relates to the generalizability of the results. To begin with, 
the research reported in Publications I and II was from a case study. Moreover, the 
number of interviewees in the interview study reported in Publication III was small 
and the interviewees were not selected randomly. Finally, the number of analyzed 
contract documents in Publication IV was limited and I was not able to independently 
Anna Hurmerinta-Haanpää 
94 
choose them. Thus, instead of providing results that are generalizable across 
countries, industries and contract types, the findings only showcase some current 
problems in contracting in general. Through this study, my aim is to invoke 
discussion within and outside the legal profession and among researchers and 
practitioners, and to encourage further research on the topic. 
The final limitation relates to the empirical nature of this work. As mentioned 
before, contract law scholars (especially in Finland) rarely conduct empirical 
research. Moreover, most of the few empirical studies that do exist are quantitative.  
Thus, a traditional contract law scholar may wonder what the legal implications of 
my work are. I have tried to translate my findings into legal language and for a legal 
audience (e.g. Erlanger et al. 2005; Suchman & Mertz 2010; Poppe 2021; Talesh et 
al. 2021), especially in Sub-chapter 5.5, but am aware of the limitations of this 
translation. However, I plan to engage in research of the legal implications of the 
functional contracting approach more thoroughly in my future work. 
5.8 Future research 
Drawing on various theories on contracts from economics, organizational and 
management studies, and law, this study offers several avenues for future research.  
First, future studies could explore whether the seven functions of contracts are 
used in different industries and contract types. For example, it would be interesting 
to know whether more innovation-driven industries utilize different contractual 
techniques to those of more traditional industries. These studies could exploit both 
quantitative and qualitative methods: Quantitative studies could examine a large 
sample of contracts, while qualitative studies could investigate the motives and 
consequences of utilizing different functions. Both research settings would require a 
multidisciplinary research team, consisting of a minimum of legal scholars, 
economists and designers. 
Second, future studies could test the feasibility of the functional contracting tools 
presented in this study and further develop them by means of contract design. This 
study focused on applying the functional contracting approach to designing a 
contracting process and assessing purchase contract documents, mainly from the 
perspectives of contract content and language. Future research projects in turn could 
apply insights from research on contract visualization, for example, to developing 
the tools. This kind of research project would require collaboration between 
researchers from various disciplines and companies. In my experience, the best way 
to structure this kind of collaboration would be in the form of a multidisciplinary 
research program, financed by public authorities, industry participants and research 
institutions. This type of research would yield benefits for both researchers and 
businesses. 
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Third, an important avenue for future research is the study of the relationships 
between contract functions, contract framing, and relational governance, and their 
mutual effects on the exchange relationship and exchange performance. Again, a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative studies would probably yield the best 
results in the examination of these relationships. 
Fourth, it would be interesting to study in detail the implications of the functional 
contracting approach for adjudication and contract law. As noted in Sub-chapter 5.5, 
the different functions and their representation in a contract could provide inductive 
information for courts when pondering whether to apply textual or contextual 
methods of adjudication. Moreover, following in Macneil’s footsteps, future 
research could develop general contract law principles for contracts, which include 
highly collaborative contract clauses, are generally highly collaborative in their 
nature, or otherwise require taking relational aspects into account. 
Finally, in the advent of contract automation tools, it would be important to study 
the content and framing of the contracts that the contract automation tools use as 
references, to avoid the development of “garbage in, garbage out” contract 
automation systems (Haapio & Linna 2020). Moreover, future studies could focus 
on the parameters of contract automation tools to determine whether they are really 
likely to bias contract functions toward safeguarding, and contract frames toward 
prevention, as current research suggests (Rich et al. forthcoming). 
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6 Conclusions 
The overall objective of this dissertation was to study the functions by which 
companies use contracts in their interorganizational exchange relations, and the 
relationship between contracts, contractual functions and relational governance. 
During the research project, I focused on three aspects: First, I studied the functional 
contracting process as a precontractual integration tool in a case in which a company 
tried to implement a new business model and introduce a new solution offering to its 
business network. Second, I examined the ways in which contracting experts used 
contracts and how they perceived the relationship between contracts and relational 
governance. Finally, I analyzed ten purchase contract documents to determine what 
contractual functions they included and how they were framed. 
This study found that, in addition to the functions identified by previous 
research––safeguarding, adaptation and coordination––contracts serve codification, 
internal management, collaboration, and policy functions. In line with previous 
studies, I found that contracts were widely used for safeguarding the interests of one 
contracting party. Essentially, organizations seemed to be burdened by outdated 
power-based supplier strategies, as their contracts were full of preventively framed 
unreasonable risk transfers and one-sided clauses. In particular, the collaborative 
function and promotive framings of contracts were underutilized. 
Based on my findings, I argue that current contracting practices and traditional 
contract theories that overemphasize opportunism are detrimental to today’s network 
economy, which is characterized by rapid, unanticipated disruptions, such as the 
COVID-19 situation which began in 2020 and is still ongoing. Thus, I urge both 
academics and practitioners to adopt a functional understanding of contracts, which 
brings to the fore their managerial and relational uses, as well as contract design 
choices that underline the promotive, user-friendly aspects of contracts. This 
understanding draws on the ideas of the proactive contracting scholars who call for 
a broader understanding of the role and function of a contract and suggest that 
contracts should be designed from legal, technical, business, and relational 
perspectives.  This means that although contracts are legal devices that manage risks 
and provide safeguards against possible problems in the business relationship, they 
are also tools for performance planning and communication, for facilitating proactive 
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coordination and flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, and for designing 
and framing collaboration, business relationships and the interaction within them 
(e.g. Rekola & Haapio 2011; Haapio 2013; Kujala et al. 2015). 
Moreover, like proactive contract scholars, the functional approach to 
contracting highlights the importance of the relationship between formal contracts 
and relational governance (e.g. Pohjonen & Visuri 2008; Nystén-Haarala et al. 2010; 
Nuottila et al. 2016; Passera 2017). In essence, I argue that contracts need to reflect 
the exchange relation and should not ignore, or even worse, contradict the relational 
norms of the exchange (e.g. Frydlinger et al. 2016). In other words, if parties want 
to create a collaborative exchange relation, the contract also needs to support 
collaboration by establishing governance mechanisms that enable open information 
exchange, joint learning and problem-solving. Moreover, contracts need to be 
framed in a manner that expresses trust and commitment to joint objectives (e.g. 
Nystén-Haarala et al. 2010; Nuottila & Nystén-Haarala 2019). This way, they 
support economic objectives while also shaping the parties’ expectations, 
relationship and collaboration (e.g. Rekola & Haapio 2011; Passera 2017). Previous 
studies presented similar ideas of including the “soft” elements of exchanges in 
formal contracts, and now finally, these ideas have also gained momentum in 
economics (e.g. Frydlinger & Hart 2020). 
I acknowledge that the transition toward the functional understanding of 
contracts is not easy. Organizations need tools to support them in this transition. This 
dissertation introduces such tools, two conceptual models––the functional 
contracting process and the functional contracting framework––to help organizations 
utilize the approach in their negotiation and contract design processes. These models 
can be tested and further developed by future studies. In addition to concrete tools, 
however, I argue that legal education must be reoriented toward the functional 
contracting approach and that students need to be taught empirical and practical 
skills. Only in this way can we legitimize the functional contracting approach as a 
relevant theory for contract law scholarship and contract law practice.  
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Abbreviations 
ALI The American Law Institute 
ALR American Legal Realism 




CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
C2C Consumer-to-Consumer 
DIMECC A Strategic Center for Research in the Finnish Digital, Internet, 
Materials & Engineering Industries 
EESC The European Economic and Social Committee 
EU The European Union 
FIMECC Finnish Metals and Engineering Competence Cluster Ltd 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
IPR Intellectual Property Right 
JFT Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
NCCUSL The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
NCMA National Contract Management Association 
NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement 
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
RFT Regulatory Focus Theory 
R&D Research and Development 
TCE Transaction Cost Economics 
T&Cs Terms and Conditions 
TEKES The Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation 
TENK The Finnish National Board on Research Integrity 
UCC Uniform Commercial Code 
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The initial idea for this Publication came from Johanna Liinamaa, and thus she was 
the corresponding author, leading and coordinating the writing process. I participated 
in the explorative, collaborative action research project that comprised the data of 
the Publication, by attending most of the monthly meetings, all the MoU 
development meetings, and occasionally other meetings. Together with Mika 
Viljanen and the company representatives, I was in charge of developing the 
functional contracting process. I took the main responsibility for writing sections 2.4 
and 2.5, and I wrote most parts of sections 4 and 5 together with Mika Viljanen. I 
also contributed to other sections of the Publication and commented and edited the 
sections written by other my co-authors. 
Publication II 
Publication II is based on the same action research study reported in Publication I. 
In Publication II, Mika Viljanen and I were in charge of the entire writing process. 
We wrote all the sections together, while the other co-authors commented on and 
edited the writing.  
Publication III 
I was the corresponding author of this Publication and had more responsibility for 
analyzing the data as well as writing the Publication than my co-author Sampo 
Viding. Essentially, I wrote all the sections of the Publication, while my co-author 
commented on and edited the writing. However, we designed and conducted the 
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